[Third indorsement.]

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,

November 25, 1864.

Respectfully referred to General R. E. Lee, inviting attention to the foregoing indorsements.

By command of the Secretary of War.

JNumbers BLAIR HOGE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Fourth indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS,
November 30, 1864.

Respectfully returned.

I will send any troops to Wilmington the Secretary may direct. In my opinion troops are as much required here as at Wilmington. It is the want all over the country. The difference between the two places at present is, that Richmond is besieged by an army three times as large as that defending it. There is no enemy as yet on the shores of Wilmington. To attack it, troops must be drawn from elsewhere, when I trust re-enforcements can be sent from the point from which the pressure is relieved. In the meantime, the North Carolina troops, as brave as any in the Confederacy, if all are brought out that can be and properly organized and instructed, are capable of protecting it.

R. E. Lee,

General.

[Fifth indorsement.]

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,

December 6, 1864.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War, asking attention to the indorsement of General Lee upon the inclosed copy of Governor Vance's letter, which was referred to him by direction of the honorable Secretary.

By order:

JNumbers BLAIR HOGE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 15, 1864.

Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War:

DEAR SIR: Permit me, acknowledging your kind favor of the 12th instant, to submit some additional consideration in reply to your objections to our proposed bill.

First. You regard such legislation as objectionable, because in the main unnecessary, since the organization asked for already virtually exists in this army by regulation and can be similarly introduced in any other.

Second. It will prove, you apprehend, embarrassing in several respects: First, a system fixed by law allows to the commanding general less freedom in adapting his resources to emergencies; second, a plan suitable for a large army may not be adapted to smaller commands; third, officers attached under law cannot be as freely transferred as the commanding general may desire.