was only prevented by an intervening swamp at Buck Head Creek, which made it almost impossible to approach, and by the failure of the Fourth Tennessee Regiment to gain the enemy's rear, for which purpose it had been detached some two hours previous. The bridge over Buck Head Creek had been carefully prepared for burning by Kilpatrick's advance guard, and on our reaching it the torch had been applied and the bridge was in flames, while a terrific fire from the enemy on the other side prevented me from immediately extinguishing the flames. I dismounted the advance brigade and advanced it through the creek bottom to the bank, and finally drove the enemy sufficiently far from the opposite bank to enable a few brave men to work their way across and drive the enemy beyond range. By great energy and hapart of my men the fire was soon extinguished, and in little more than an hour the bridge was reconstructed and our troops passing over. The passage, however, was very slow, on account of the rude and frail construction of the bridge. After advancing a mile I discovered the enemy's position, and ordered General Dibrell to turn their right flank by moving through a wood which screened the movement.

As night was fast approaching it became important to strike the enemy immediately, although only about 1,200 of my command has crossed the creek. I moved upon the enemy and drove in his pickets. On discovering his line I observed that General Dibrell, in attempting to turn his flank (although he had moved nearly a mile to our left), had nevertheless, encountered the enemy's line of battle, which extended still beyond his position. Having parts of Harrison's and Ashby's brigades with me, the former being in advance, I placed the Third Arkansas Regiment in line, and the Eighth and Eleventh Texas Regiments in column and charged the enemy's position. Nothing could have exceeded the gallantry with which these troops responded to the bugle's call, and hurled themselves upon the enemy, driving his cavalry in confusion and finally encountering the breast-works. This so terrified the enemy as to cause him to flee it uncontrollable confusion. Unfortunately the open ground did not continue, and we finally encountered a line so positioned that it could not be approached by cavalry. I ordered Ashby's brigade to turn the enemy's left flank and take possession of the Louisville road, upon which the enemy was retreating. Owing to approaching dusk, Colonel Ashby, by accident, got on a road to the left of the indicated by my order, and notified me that he held possession of the Louisville road. This error enabled the enemy to move off, by scattering through fields and wood without order or organization.

During the night Kilpatrick sought the protection of his infantry, which he did not venture to forsake again during the campaign, no doubt being too much demoralized to again meet our cavalry. Fearing the enemy might make another attempt to raid or march upon Augusta, I placed pickets at all the crossing of Brier Creek, and located my main force at Rocky Springs Church.

On the morning of December 2, the Fourteenth Army Corps and Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched upon Waynesborough by the Louisville road. I met and checked them at Rocky Creek. After a warm engagement they moved off to my left and crossed a short distance below off a temporarily constructed bridge, and, by moving through the fields, turned off toward Thomas' Station. This necessitated my falling back.

The following day I moved down and attacked the enemy, driving in their pickets and stopping their destruction of the railroad. Per-