According to this plan the division of General Stevens was to from the assaulting column against the enemy's works at Secessionville, and, being formed in the utmost silence at his outer pickets, was to move forward at the first break of day upon the enemy's batteries, while the remainder of the troops, comprising Williams' brigade and a part of my division, moving together from the camp at Grimball's, were to act as a support to General Stevens, protecting his left and rear from an attack of the enemy's forces from that direction. So important was the duty assigned to this covering force deemed, and so convinced was General Benham of the probability of an attack from that direction, that he ordered, in the event of the repulse of Stevens, that the covering troops should not renew the assault.

The parts to be performed by the two columns were therefore well defined and distinctly understood; that of General Stevens was to assault and carry the works at Secessionville; that composed of troops of General Williams' brigade and my division was to cove the assault and protect if from attack on the left and rear.

The organization of the left column having been left with me, I added to the brigade of Williams the Ninety-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers and one section of Hamilton's battery, and arranged the force as follows:

First. Third Rhode Island, five companies; second, Third New Hampshire, ten companies; third, Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania, six companies; fourth, Company E, Third Artillery, one section. Acting Brigadier-General Williams' brigade.

Fifth. Sixth Connecticut, two companies; seventh Forty-seventh New York, eight companies. Colonel Chatfield's Brigade.

Eighth. Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, six companies; ninth, First New York Volunteer Engineers, three companies. Colonel Welsh's brigade.

Tenth. Artillery, two sections.

Eleventh. Cavalry, two squadrons.

The remaining troops were left in camp and on picket duty, from which they could not be withdrawn without compromising the safety of the camp and depot. Orders were issued to call the men at 2 a. m. and have them in line for marching at 3 a. m. All this was accomplished, and at the appointed hour the column was in motion, and proceeded to and formed under cover of the woods, about 1 mile in advance of our camp, to await information of the advance of General Stevens' column, as had been agreed upon. Prior to receiving such intelligence, however, a few stray shots on our right and to our front indicated that General Stevens' command was advancing, and without waiting further the column was at once pushed forward.

By this time daylight was upon us, but as the morning was dark and cloudy objects could not be clearly discovered to any considerable distance. I should remark here, that just after or about the time I gave the order for the advance from camp I was joined by General Benham, who assumed the command of the column and who retained it during the action, leaving me responsible for a division only. Moving rapidly to the front, I formed my command partly behind a hedger ow parallel to the front of the enemy's works, partly a little in rear, and brought up two pieces of artillery to open upon the enemy, and then proceeded to the front to ascertain exactly the condition of affairs there.

I should have stated that soon after the column was put in motion form the woods, where it had been halted, a messenger came from General Stevens to say that he was advancing, and before we had reached our position a message from General Stevens asking immediate support