The enemy has largely increased his force on Ediston Island, and has reoccupied Little Edisto and Whooping Islands, directly opposite Pineberry, on the Edisto Ferry, at either of which localities he can land any force within 5 miles of these headquarters, where all our stores and sick are. Hence I have deemed it essential to have a force near my entrenchments on Slann's Island Creek, as well as to contest his gaining a position on the main-land at Pineberry. Should the enemy land at White Point, which he can do at his opinion, he could easily take this place, had I no force convenient to meet him. Rantowles Bridge is 24 miles from White Point, and of course the railroad, only 12 miles, could be easily seized if the march of the foe is not checked. The force on John's and Wadmalaw Islands I consider essentially necessary to the safety of the troops on the main-land. To prevent any movement of the enemy to cut off my main-land force I have made preparations to check his landing at Simmons' Bluff and also at Togodo Creek. But I am of the opinion that, should be land between this point and Church Flats, he could be easily attacked in front by General Ripley (and the forces I have already in position within striking distance of Rantowles), and I could with my force from other positions attack his rear and left flank, which movements, if done in concert, will certainly retard his march on the city of Charleston, if not successful in cutting off his entire army from their re-enforcements. I have ordered the guns at Willstown to be removed immediately, and, should I not receive further instructions, will send them to Rantowles. The Pineberry Battery of two guns will also be moved in a few days. The Willstown road has always, been my base line of operations,and I have now a regiment of infantry, two batteries, and a cavalry force between the road and Wadmalaw River, with instructions to contest the landing of the enemy. It is impossible for me to vacate this place and protect the railroad, and to defend it will require the force I have now in advance. General Ripley and myself have had an understanding for mutual support of each other. I have determined to check the enemy as much as possible, falling back to Rantowles, where our commands would be united. I would respectfully suggest the necessity of a platform train, to be kept either at Jacksonborough or Adams Run Depot, in order to more speedily effect the uniting of our troops in case I should be compelled to retire to Jacksonborough.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. EVANS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS,
Richmond, Va., April 14, 1862.

Major General J. C. PEMBERTON,

Commanding Department, Pocotaligo, S. C.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 9th instant,* to the Adjutant and Inspector General, concerning the difficulties in the way of re-enlistments in the State troops and the connection of railroads in Augusta, has been referred to General Lee, who directs me to say that it is of the utmost importance that the State troops, now around Savannah continue in service, either that of the State or the Confederacy. He had previously written to General Lawton to this effect, and hopes no efforts will

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* See Series I, Vol. VI, p.430.

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