low the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, and not 54 miles above the junction, as you suppose. The point in the Narrows selected by Captain Moreno for placing the obstructions is about 90 miles, and not, as you suppose, 16 miles below the junction. I make these corrections in your statements, as it is important that these localities should be properly understood in deciding questions that will be presented in connection with these defenses.

on this visit I was accompanied by Lieutenant Jones, of the Navy (commanding Confederate gunboat Chattahoochee), and Lieutenant Latrobe, of the engineer department, and feel indebted to both of them for valuable suggestions. After as thorough an examination as we were able to make we were of the opinion that the points selected by Captain Moreno and approved by the commanding general were the best that could be occupied. The most important of these points was the one in the Narrows, about 90 miles below the junction of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers. At that point the channel is narrow, and on both sides of the river, extending several by infantry. The batteries placed there for the protection of the obstructions cannot be turned. On account of these swamps there are serious difficulties in the erection of batteries, which however, with time and labor can be overcome. The obstructions prepared by the commissioners of Georgia have been sunk at this point, and Captain Moreno is now pushing forward the erection of the batteries with all the force and means that can be commanded. Until the battery is completed, or at least until a portion of the guns can be placed in position, the obstructions would amount to temporary delay against a movement of the enemy's bunboats up the river. I shall provide in the mean time for such resistance as can made by sharpshooters along the banks of the river, though I attach very little importance to that mode of resistance against gunboats. In this connection I would suggest that the gunboat Chattahoochee, under the command of Lieutenant Jones, now effectually stopped from going to sea by the skinning of these obstructions, should be ordered down to the obstructions for their protection until the batteries can be completed. The armament of this boat is superior to any guns we shall have for our batteries. These obstructions in the Narrows constitute, in my opinion, the main defense of the river. If the enemy should be enabled to silence our batteries there and remove the abstractions should feel very little confidence in a successful resistance at points higher up the river. After leaving the Narrows the river becomes much wider and more difficult of obstructing, and there is no point where the enemy could not land below obstructions, and with a sufficient land force, turn the batteries that might be erected for their protection. Besides, obstructions placed in the river above this point must be partial, as the river affords the only mode of communication with batteries at the Narrows, and must be kept open for that reason. Obstructions could however be prepared and be ready to be sunk when it was no longer necessary to keep up the communication. The position of the Narrows is in every respect as possible. I have therefore directed Captain Moreno to place there three 32-pounders,and with the approval of the commanding general I would as soon as possible erect another battery of three guns bearing upon the channel of the river at the same point. In these two batteries I should place the best and heaviest guns that could be had and concentrate, as far as practicable our defense of the river at that point. Attaching, as I do, so much importance to this