make a successful stand at your first position after leaving Coosawhatchie. Should he come in overwhelming force, he would send a strong detachment around your right flank beyond the small causeway and thus force a retreat to the works at Coosawhatchie.

The woods upon the left of the position near the river should be cut down, so that the guns from Coosawhatchie could command the approach of the enemy on your left flank.

Should the enemy approach in great force, your only hope would be to hold the works at Coosawhatchie, which you might be able to do until re-enforced. A desperate and determined defense should be made at that position. If, however, you should be forced or retire, the best line of retreat would be by the road to Pocotaligo, in order ot form at junction with me. Should that road, however, be taken by the enemy, your line of retreat would be by Possum Course [Corner?], above the point where the Coosawhatchie and Tulifiny branch. This crossing is only practicable for cavalry and infantry, and the cavalry should take the footmen behind them. Your wagons and artillery would have to cross higher up, at a point marked on the map as Hickory Hill Post-Office. It is proper for me to state that should I be forced from Pocoborough. Should you be obliged to abandon Coosawhatchie, you will endeavor to form a junction with me. You will send two of your guides to Possum Corner and two to the crossing above, in order that the route may be thoroughly understood. It may be considered a maxim on our long line of defense, with a force so inadequate for the purpose, that the commanding points only can be defended. In your special command that commanding point is the bridge and railroad over the Coosawhatchie River. If that can be defended you should be reenforced from Pocotaligo and from Charleston. If the railroad is worth holding, the re-enforcements should be strong enough to drive the enemy from that portion of the road west of the Coosawhatchie which they may have seized. If not, we must look toward Walterborough and the Edisto River as the second line of defense and base of operations. We would then have to depend upon George's Station and Branchville as points of supply. We should hope for victory, but be prepared for defeat, which would only be temporary, and might be made glorious.

Yours, very sincerely,

W. S. WALKER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure Numbers 4.]

SPECIAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT, Numbers 50.
Pocotaligo, February 23, 1863.

In case the enemy land and advance from Port Royal Ferry the pickets at Cownpens, at Mackay's Point, and on Kean's Neck road, near the bridge over Chisolm's Island, will remain concealed from observation. All the rest will retire in the direction of the main body at Leverett's, watching the movements of the enemy. A picket at Leverett's will climb the tree at that post and report to headquarters.

Should the enemy land at Mackay's Point and Port Royal Ferry, all the pickets will retire. Should he land at Mackay's Point only, all the pickets will retire save those at Port Royal Ferry and Chisolm's bridge. Upon the arrival of the pickers at Garden's Corner, a squad will be sent down the Combahee Ferry road. They will conceal themselves at the side of the road and watch. They can send report of the enemy's ad-