for them to rendezvous the prospect of an immediate attack grew fainter; the troops would be very raw; no answer was received from the President or yourself accepting them; the disciplined troops were reaching our coast from North Carolina, and the season for seeding the land was rapidly approaching; I therefore suspended the call, of which I a praised you.

The following telegram sand extract of the letter from Mr. Miles were received by General Garlington and that from Mr. Orr to myself arrived during my absence at home:

[From Honorable James L. Orr.-Extract, dated February 25, 1863.]

On reading your proclamation I called to see the Secretary of War to ascertain from him what troops he had sent to South Carolina and what other troops he proposed to send. I commenced the conversation by telling him of your proclamation, and expressing my regret that you had found it necessary, in your judgment, to call ut the militia, and inquired if he could not send troops enough to avoid the necessity. He said, substantially, that the thought it unnecessary that the militia should have been called out; that they were not efficient; that one trained regiment that had been under fire was worth four or five of raw militia; that they consumed as much of the commissary stores as an equal number of efficient troops, and that it was necessary to husband our commissary stores with he greatest caution; that when he was telegraphed on the subject he did not encourage the call, but did not feel at liberty to say it must not be done; that the had already sent one brigade; that he had another in North Carolina ready at a moment's notice to send wherever the enemy might make the attack; that while appearances indicated an attack on Savannah or Charleston, it might be a feint, and that the troops should be kept ready to move at a moment's notice to the point where the attack was actually made; that Ransom's division would all be sent if needed. He stated, further, that the army of the enemy was greatly reduced on the Rappahannock; that the retiring troops were concentrating at Newport News and Fort Monroe, whether to advance by way of Suffolk or Richmond or whether they were merely collecting to be sent by transports to Charleston or some other southern point was not certainly known; that, with a view of being ready for any contingency, General Lee had already sent nearly all of Longstreet's army corps (Hood's and Pickett's divisions) to a point between this city and Petersburg, on the line of railroad, so that they could b in readiness to march toward Suffolk if the enemy came in that direction, and if they were sent by transports that the troops could take the cars for Charleston. He is earnest in his purpose to have Charleston defended at all hazards, and without some accident, now wholly unexpected, you may rest assured that he will send whatever number of troops may be considered necessary for the successful defense of the city.

[Telegrams from Honorable Mr. Miles to General Garlington, February 26.]

Calling out militia was not done at instance of authorities here. Entirely in the control of the Governor. I fully concur in your views, but what can be do here? Troops will continue to be sent as occasion demands.

[Telegram from Honorable Mr. Miles to General Garlington, February 28.]

Secretary of War thinks you had better only organize militia, but not send to the coast unless in the event of some disaster. Every effort will be made to send re-enforcements from time to time as events demand and as the movements of the enemy elsewhere will permit. Major Jordan w rites me that he is sanguine of our success in the event of an attack.

[From Mr. Miles.-Extract, dated March 1, 1863.]

My replies to your telegrams were perhaps sufficiently full to render it hardly necessary to write you on their subject-matter. The object of the War Department originally, in desiring to retain the regiments of reserves, was to give time for the sending on of re-enforcements. The impression seemed to prevail in Charleston that an attack was so imminent that it might be looked for daily, nay almost hourly. The transportation of troops from North Carolina was very slow, not amounting to 1,000 men a day, hence we are not a little surprised-not to say mortified-that the Legislature (if they believed the attack so imminent as the military authorities in Charleston did) should refuse to retain in service the regiments of Reserves even for