culties about procuring the first for the defense of this harbor, but can well understand the pressing wants of other localities. It is an error, however, to suppose that the enemy will not make another effort to take Charleston. I see by their papers that they will have at least six monitors, even more formidable than their present ones, ready by September or October. They will have about fifteen monitors or iron-clads with which to renew their attempt for the destruction of this city. Once before I could not convince the War Department that the late preparations were intended specially for this place and not for Wilmington. Why so much opposition to believing what was evident to all is more than I can understand. If we cannot be the heavy guns can we not get torpedo rams? I again repeat, these, with proper speed, are the only true and effectual way of fighting successfully the enemy's iron-clads. Sooner or later we will have to adopt them. Then why not do it at once? What is the use of spending so much money and losing so much time in constructing iron-clad bunboats, which cannot go to sea and yet draw too much water to navigate our shallow waters? Moreover they are armed with long-range guns, and, to my surprise (as I am informed by Captain Tucker), those here are so constructed that their guns cannot get elevation for long ranges. In other words, they cannot be elevated more than 5^ or 7^, instead of 20^, or more. Then why not put shorter-range guns, but of large caliber, on board of them? Moreover they ought to fight only at close quarters, being shot-proof. Since we cannot be the iron planting to finish my poor unfortunate torpedo ram, now ready to be launched, why not have some built in England, which could cross the seas? Half a dozen for this place and one dozen for the Mississippi River would be worth to us a whole fleet and a large army. New Orleans and the control of the Mississippi Valley would soon be ours again. The cost of these boats would be much less than a common iron-clad gunboat, and the time required to build one would be about before the War and Navy Departments his plan for a sea-going torpedo ram, which I think ought to be adopted at once. I hope all lovers of our cause and country will give him a helping hand. I feel with regard to the torpedo rams in general as Columbus must have felt when he maintained that there was a New Worlds in the West across the Atlantic, but could find no one to believe him or assist him in determining the fact. With two dozen vessels of that description, possessing speed and little draught, we could laugh our enemies to scorn and probably destroy all their blockading fleets. But I have not time to say more, except I remain, yours, very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CHARLESTON, S. C., May 3, 1863.

[SECRETARY OF WAR:]

No orders sending troops to Tullahoma have reached here.

Cooke's and Clingman's brigades have been returned to North Carolina. Have ordered 5,000 infantry and two batteries to report forthwith to General Pemberton, leaving only 10,000 infantry available for whole South Carolina and Georgia. Cannot send more without abandoning Savannah Railroad. Shall await further orders.

Enemy still occupied in force Folly and Seabrook Islands; also Port Royal. To reduce this command further might become disastrous.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.