This force, if concentrated at either Charleston or Savannah for a certain period, could doubtless make a stout defense; but which, kept distributed in occupation of the important points, districts, and positions now held from Georgetown, S. C., to Florida, would offer but feebly resistance to any serious attack of the enemy. If it is the irrevocable determination of the War Department that this command shall be thus reduced I can but make such disposition of the remanent of my forces as may appear best calculated to conceal my weakness. With my cavalry I shall make a show of occupation of the Second and third Military Districts and the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; but it must not be lost sight of that my complications with Savannah can be cut by the enemy without the use of a large force whensoever he may choose to attempt it; and when that is done he will get possession of a large extent of rich rice lands, and large stores of rice not yet brought to market, which would be a heavy loss. Furthermore, it were then but a simple and easy military operation for a column, not a large one, to penetrate to Branchville, not more than 35 miles distant from Pocotaligo, and thus entirely interrupt my communications with the interior, as a glance at the map will show.

The sickly season on this coast will begin in about six weeks; then a small reduction of the infantry force might take place. It was as late as the 16th of June last year that the enemy made his attack at Secessionville, on James Island, so nearly successful, and which with success would have placed Charleston at his mercy despite the harbor defenses.

It is proper to add here that the day before your order to detach the last division was received I had organized and put in motion an expedition against the enemy on Seabrook Island in support of a naval operation, the object of which is to destroy the iron-clads with the boat torpedo contrivance of Captain Lee. The naval expedition under Lieutenant Parker, supported by some troops, will nevertheless be attempted, but I was reluctantly obliged to recall the infantry with which I hoped to effect the surprise and capture of the enemy on land in the confusion which it was hoped would result from the attack with torpedoes.

I must respectfully ask your attention to the paper herewith, marked A, exhibiting the force of all arms that will be left me after he execution of your orders and that in the department this time last year.

You will perceive that I shall be left with 12,664 men of all arms less than at the same period last year, and when the force of the enemy was less threatening in its positions than now; that my infantry force for the support of the lines around Charleston will be but 1,547; wheras last year the infantry force for the same duty was 6,462, leaving the lines on James Island virtually without infantry support, and open to seizure and the inevitable fall of Charleston.

In conclusion I must observe that the troops in the works cannot be withdrawn from their guns and concentrated for defense of any threatened point; they are already at a minimum force for the proper service of the batteries, and to withdraw them here or at Savannah involves a surrender of the work so abandoners, and in ultimate effect the failure of the whole defense.

Finally, it may as well be considered that the enemy will be speedily acquainted with the extent of these reductions and that he will act accordingly.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General, Commanding.