WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,

Richmond, Va., May 14, 1863.

CHARLES MACBETH, Esq.,

Mayor of Charleston, S. C.:

SIR: A fuller explanation than I can well afford by telegraph seems requisite from me in relation to the withdrawal of troops from General Beauregard's command, which has not unnaturally awakened the solicitude of yourself and other citizens for the safety of your city. You will of course understand that I should have preferred leaving the full force of the department to repel any possible attacks of the enemy, and that only the exigencies of the service have constrained, in the exercise of the best judgment I can form of the relative needs of most important points, the employment of a portion of the troops in your department elsewhere. Our resources are not ample enough to enable us to afford absolute security anywhere, and we are obliged to have regard to the immanency of danger and the most pressing needs. Now, at this time there is no point so vital to the whole Confederacy in such imminent peril as Vicksburg, and I cannot doubt that it demands all the succor that can possibly be spared to it. On the other hand, the late brilliant repulse at your city has deterred the enemy, as is believed, from all thoughts of present attack. He is known to have sent back large numbers of his troops from your coast to North Carolina and the Rappahannock. I do not think his force there can be more than 10,000-certainly not above 15,000-men. Now, from very late returns from your department there were in it 32,000 effectives, with some 7,000 absent or on leave in addition. Deducting the force in Lower Georgia and Florida, and making a liberal deduction for the forces returned to North Carolina, there would still be upward of 25,000 effectives for the defense of Charleston and Savannah and the intermediate line. the withdrawal of the 10,000 ordered to Mississippi still eaves upward of 15,000 effectives, with a considerable reserve of the absentees and sick, the latter of whom, being from the whole command, were of course above the average to be expected from the remaining force, and as they recover must swell the number of effectives. It is true, of these some 5,000 or 6,000 were cavalry, or, to speak more correctly, mounted gunmen, for they are armed with guns and pistol and usually dismount to fight; but this is the very kind of force which has been represented to me as most desirable and effective for defense along the lines of railroad. They can move and concentrate with such rapidity that for such defense they amount to nearly a double force of infantry.

In this situation, with a force equal at least to that of the enemy, with the advantage, in case of approach toward either Charleston or Savannah, of complete entrenchments and numerous batteries, do you not have as reasonable assurance of adequate defense and safety as can be expected with the limited resources at our command? I can assure you that very frequently this city has been with less than 5,000 men of all arms for its defense and the enemy below on the Peninsula, within 30 miles and without any intervening force, in numbers varying from 20,000 to 30,000 men, and with command of our river to within 10 or 12 miles of the city.

I mention this in no invidious or reproachful spirit, but simply to show how similar necessities to those now constraining the diminution of your defenders have compelled us to act in relation to the capital of the Confederacy.

I have no doubt there has been some exaggeration of the forces re-