work at Secessionville was not "an advance on Charleston," distant 10, nor "an attack of Fort Johnson," distant 7 miles. General Benham had located his "entrenched encampment" so as to meet the conditions of the order, by placing it within the protection of the gunboats from Stono River on the left and from the creek of Folly River on the right. He found, however, that it was covered by the fire of the earthwork at Secessionville, immediately in his front, from which shot and shell were thrown into the camps both of General Stevens and Wright. To render his encampment, therefore, in the language of the order, "secure", and, indeed, to enable him to continue its occupation, it was absolutely indispensable that the earthwork should be taken. The enterprise was not deemed difficult of its success at all doubtful. It was believed by General Benham then, and is believed by him now, that the movement as not only a violation of General Hunter's order, but that it was in strict compliance with it, and was, indeed, under all the circumstances in which he was placed, "a military necessity." It must be admitted, at least, that the order was susceptible of the interpretation he gave it; and for following the sincred convictions of his judgment he shouldn't be summarily dismissed and degraded.

General Hunter has preferred no charges against General Benham because of this attack on the earthwork, though it appears from a single expression in one of his letters to the Secretary of war that he regarded the movement as in violation of his order. It must be inferred that it was in opposition to some plan or purpose actually entertained him in the order to General Benham cannot be successfully maintained.

The question of disobedience of the order mentioned being thus disposed of, it remains to inquire whether the attack itself evidenced such rashness or incapacity as justified the Government in stripping General Benham of his commission. Nothing is found in the record which would warrant an affirmative response to this inquiry. The earthwork was defended by but about 600 men. General Benham had some fifteen regiments and two batteries with which to assault it; and the knowledge he had that the work was being rapidly strengthened, urged him to prompt action. The plan and all the arrangements for the movement, though bold, appear to have been well matured, and justified the confident expectation of a favorable issue. The cause of the failure which followed sufficiently appears from the statement of Colonel Hawley, who commanded a brigade on the occasion, and was in the front. His detailed explanations, which are illustrated by a map, leave no reason to doubt but that had the officer charged with conducting the assault arrived, as it was intended he should, earlier, and directed personally and in proper order the march of the troops in their advance, and had he not ordered the troops under Colonel Hawley to fall back, the attack would have been successful. When this order to retreat was given, our troops, though suffering severely, were "advancing steadily", and were within "100 yards of the works."

Generals Stevens and Wright allege that in the council which was held the evening before, they expressed openly their opposition to the attack being made. General Stevens certainly preferred that it should be made in open daylight, and both he and General Wright may have feed the opposition announced after the disaster occurred; but Captain Drayton, of the U. S. Navy, who was present, describes their bearing and conversation in the following words:

In the meeting referred to, I cannot recollect any opposition to your proposed advance on Secessionville the following morning, except as regarded the time you had