only) to about 1 or 2 miles west of Fort Johnson for shelling Charleston, after, of course, the troops previously across the Stono shall (at it is presumed they will be in forced sufficient) have routed the enemy from James Island, below Newton Cut and James Island Creek. The heavy breaching ordnance (Parrott and James guns) were to kept afloat till it was determined whether Morris Island could at once be taken and batteries planted there against Fort Sumter, or, in a doubt of this, they could be landed at the same place with the columbiads, at the eastern most reach of the Stono, and transferred to Fort Johnson for use at that more distant, but possibly effective, point for Fort Sumter. If successful at James Island, and we appear sufficiently strong to spare the force, especially if Morris Island were seized, i had also in project to send around and from the Stono nearly one-half of our force, to be landed in Dewey's Inlet, about 9 or 10 miles north of Fort Moultrie, under cover of gunboats, if needed, and then to march down about 6 or 7 miles, with Parrott artillery, to a point about 1 mile northwest of Moultrie, for the purpose of attacking that fort.

In connection with and as a part of these operations, I proposed that, from the time of the commencement of the transfer of the cavalry and artillery, the enemy should be threatened and kept on the alert in the Savannah River and at Warsaw Sound; that boat or other pickets should be frequently pushed forward to the extreme limits of safety; that the balloon should be sent up every two or there days, and that the heavy gunboats in the vicinity, especially at Warsaw, should be frequently moving as if in reconnaissance, and towards the Bonaventure or Thunderbolt Bluff, as near as may be fully safe. This to continue till directions are sent that it is of no further use toward deceiving the enemy, and at the latest moment possible, before transferring the main body of the infantry from Port Royal, I propose to have a detachment from General Stevens' command make a dash at the railroad, which, the general states, is entirely practicable either toward the Salkehatchie or the Coosawhatchie, and burn or otherwise destroy the trestling or bridges, so as to put this route, temporarily at least, out of repair.

It was also in my original project to submit for consideration of yourself and the flag-officer the employment on service with our land forces, to strengthen them, of a body of such marines and to her s trained to the use of small arms, as could be spared from the blockading squadron, while the squadron itself might aid us greatly by diversions, properly timed, say, to the hour at which we reach or expect to reach the Stono, by a fire of shot and shell at the batteries at the mouth of the Stono, and also by a similar fire upon Sullivan's Island and the troops near Beach Inlet, if it can be done with safety to themselves from artillery fire from the land, the vessels avoiding in all cases any attack at or near Dewey's Inlet, our projected possible landing place.

The above is the sum of my original project, as prepared at the time stated, about the 1st instant. The information that we have recently gained, and that appears to be reliable, from the negroes of the steamer Planter and the Fort Sumter deserters, which seems to assure us of the evacuation and destruction of the batteries at Stono Inlet, would lead me to modify my plan as follows:

The original project of the transfer of the infantry, cavalry, and field artillery (except one four-gun battery) to Edisto as secretly as possible for General Wright being carried out, I would have the last column (Stevens') and this four-gun battery ready to move to Stono Inlet in vessels, after having had, the day previous to their landing, the inlet reconnoitered, and, if found evacuated, then to be occupied by the Navy, that