Va., relieving Brigadier-General Rosecrans, and assuming command March 29, 1862. The disposition and number of troops upon my arrival within the department were reported to me as follows:

Within the District of the Cumberland, comprising all east of the Alleghanies and west of the Department of the Potomac, three regiments of infantry and one company of cavalry; the district commanded by Brigadier General R. C. Schenck.

Within the Cheat Mountain District, comprising all west of the Alleghanies, south of the railroad line, north of the valley of the Gualey, and east of the Weston and Summerville road, six regiments and five companies of infantry, four companies of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery; district under command of Brigadier General R. H. Milroy.

Within the Railroad District, comprising all north and west of the railroad lines, thirty-four companies of infantry of different regiments, eight companies of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery; Brigadier General B. F. Kelley commanding.

Within the District of Kanawha, comprising all the valleys of the Kanawha and Guyandotte Rivers and moth of the Brig sandy, twelve regiments and three companies of infantry, fifteen companies of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery; district command by Brigadier General J. D. Cox.

Within the Districts of Big Sandy Valley and the Gap, commanded respectively by colonels Garfield and Carter, were troops estimated in the total at a fraction over 9,000 men.

The total of troops within the department, as ascertained or estimated-that is to say,of infantry thirty-five and two-tenths regiments; of cavalry thirty-six companies, and of artillery nine batteries-stood in figures at 34,271 men.

Shortly after assuming command I was informed by the Secretary of War that the troops in Eastern Kentucky and southwestern Virginia,m although included within the limits of my department, would not be subject to my command or control. This deducted, agreeably to the estimates turned oven to me, 9,195 men. Adding to these the percentage allowed in estimates as sick, &c., and not available for duty, a further decrease took place of 6,269 men; laving balance of 18,807 effective force-say, in round numbers, 19,000 men.

With these troops it was necessary to guard a frontier of 350 miles, approached by roads more or less at rectangles with lines in occupation, and having few interior cross-communications. They were also employed to guard the depots, bridges, and tunnels on 300 miles of railroad and over 200 miles of water communication. Several partially formed regiments and companies were found waiting at different localities on my arrival at Wheeling, and asked only to be mustered in and furnished with arms to do good and loyal service. recent orders, however, of the War Department concerning enlistments and the increase of regiments forbade my acceptance of more than a limited proportion of these troops, and this proportion only as a reminder upon previous quotas of the State. By special permission two howitzer batteries were afterward organized, but at a date so late as to compel detail from troops already in service to make up the rank and file, thus failing to increase the total of enlisted men within the department.

The enemy, beginning already to gain strength by re-enforcements opposite the whole extent of my lines,was not hesitative in his demonstrations. Early in april General Miroy, within the Cheat Mountain District, was attacked near Monterey by a force of over 1,000 rebels with cavalry and artillery. After a short engagement the enemy were put