McDowell or when his troops arrived on my left, because I was too much occupied on the right, where the battle was fought principally. I did not see General McDowell during that day until 6.30 minutes p. m., when I saw him and his staff arriving.

On the next day, the 30th August, I did not know where General McDowell's corps was, and I did not see General McDowell during the whole day, as much as I can remember, but I knew that General Reynolds' division was on the left of our line, or near the left of our line, on the 29th and 30th. During the 30th August, same day when General Porter made his attack on the center and was forced to retreat, I received a dispatch, which I believe was transmitted to me by an officer of General McDowell's staff, but the dispatch was written by General Porter, as much as I can remember. In this dispatch it was said that probably the conflict would end fatally, and that General McDowell should push my corps forward. I did not receive an order but made all preparations to assist General porter or to take his troops up, who were at that time coming out by squads-out of the woods by squads. I did not receive any order from

General McDowell during the day.

I have also to add in regard to the connection between this corps and that of General McDowell, that when at Sulphur Springs General pope wrote to me that General McDowell would support me at Waterloo Bridge, but I did not see any troops of General McDowell's there for some miles from that point; and at Waterloo Bridge on that same day I received an order, through General McDowell of which one page was missing, so that I do not know what my orders were. I immediately sent to General McDowell for instructions, but he answered that he could not give me any. I am not sure when I received my order form General Pope, which showed exactly when my corps was attached to General McDowell's, but I can find it out. The officer whom I had sent to General McDowell then proceeded to Warrenton Junction to find General Pope. He returned when it was nearly dark with an order of General Pope's for my corps to march to Warrenton that night, which I did. When the corps was at Warrenton with the main force, and I came in with the rear guard about 2.30 a.m. On the next day I met an officer of General McDowell's at the entrance of the town, who delivered me a dispatch, in which it was said that I should force with my corps the passage of the bridge at Waterloo on that some morning, which was an impossibility. This is to show that I received an order from General McDowell on that day at that hour. When my corps had arrived at Gainesville I received and order from General McDowell at abut 3 o'clock in the morning, saying that I should march to Manassas. I asked the orderly when he had left General McDowell, and he said that he had left him two hours ago, although the headquarters of General McDowell were not more than 200 paces from my own.

These are the principal facts I can give up.

Question by the COURT. Have you knowledge of any matter or thing occurring during the period of the operations detailed by you in the answer to the last interrogatory tending to show that General McDowell was either treacherous, inattentive to his duties as a general officer, neglectful or otherwise in co-operating with his associate commanders, or going to their aid or the aid of this subordinate commanders, or wanting in personal courage or discretion in battle, or in the disposition of his troops, or otherwise unfaithful or inefficient as a general officer, and if you do, detail your knowledge specifically as though particularly interrogated in respect thereto?

Answer. I must say, gentlemen, that these are extensive questions, and you will allow me to take them up in detail. The first question, "tending to show whether General McDowell has been treacherous," &c. Now treacherous might relate to his connection with me or the enemy. Now you want me, I suppose, to say with regard to the enemy. In regard to treachery, I have no proof or no knowledge of such actions of General McDowell which deserves the name of treachery, as far relates to connection with the enemy or communication with the enemy or other such acts. In regard to the second point, "inattention to his duties as a general officer," as relates to myself and my judgment, he was not attentive enough, and to qualify my judgment I will give you a few points. In the first place I do not believe that General McDowell did what he could under the circumstances to hinder General Longstreet to join General Jackson. I am not certain, but I believe that he left not a sufficient force at Thoroughfare Gap, or in the neighborhood, to prevent the enemy's troops to pass by this defile, which is very easy to defend. I further believe that there was not the necessary co-operation between the two corps of the [two] corps on their way to Manassas-my corps and that of General McDowell's-by which want of co-operation we lost the opportunity to attack the enemy on his left flank while he was retreating from Manassas.

On the 29th August, at the first battle of Bull Run, it would have been necessary