opinion that General McDowell's troops were at Culpeper before, and I did not understand why they did not assist General Banks on that day, and why he had to fight alone with 9,000 men against 25,000, the battle resulting almost in the destruction of General Banks' corps.

3rd. When at Waterloo Bridge I was under the supposition that General McDowell would support my corps.

The following causes he stated to qualify his judgment that General McDowell was not attentive to his duties as a general officer:

1st. I do not believe that General McDowell did what he could under the circumstances to hinder General Longstreet to join General Jackson. I am not certain, but I believe that he left not a sufficient force at Thoroughfare Gap, or in the neighborhood, to prevent the enemy's troops to pass by this defile, which is very easy to defend.

2nd. I further believe that there was not the necessary co-operation between the two corps on their way to Manassas-my corps and that of General McDowell-by which want of co-operation we lost the opportunity to attack the enemy on his left flank while he was retreating from Manassas.

3rd. On the 29th of August, at the battle of Bull Run, it would have been necessary that General McDowell had made a disposition by which our two corps could act with more unity.

4th. I believe he could be on the battle-field with the greater part of his troops at an earlier hour of the day. I also believe that he did not give his troops the right direction on the 29th, because, instead of attacking the enemy on his right flank by coming in on our left, his troops, as much as I could see, came in from the rear; that is to say, instead of coming in the direction of New Market, he came in the direction of Centreville.

5th. I cannot understand for what reason General McDowell left the position he had on the 28th in the evening, which would have been, according to my opinion, the right place for attacking the enemy on his right flank on the 29th.

6th. I think that General McDowell neglected to get a personal knowledge of the affairs of my corps on the 29th of August.

As to the first case presented by General Sigel-that of the operations in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that of my not having assisted General McClellan when I was at Fredericksburg, which General Sigel mentions as another cause for his unfavorable opinion of General McDowell-they are so fully given elsewhere in this statement that it will not be necessary to repeat them here.

GENERAL SIGEL'S CHARGE OF MY FAILING TO SUPPORT GENERAL BANKS AT THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN.

The next case is that of my not having assisted General Banks at the battle of Cedar Mountain till after he was nearly destroyed.

This is a simple matter, fully explained by the testimony of General Roberts and General Pope (proceedings of January 8 and January 13).

The latter, after stating the movements of the various bodies of troops prior to the 8th and those of the enemy these movements were to meet, says:

During the 8th of August, or at least during the earlier part of that day, it was uncertain whether the main force of the enemy was marching upon Sperryville or upon Culpeper, but in either case I considered it proper to concentrate my forces in the direction of Culpeper, in order constantly to be interposed between the enemy and the lower fords of the Rappahannock.