enemy suffered terribly. The odds were overwhelming. The officer (Colonel Carroll) neglected to burn the bridge at Port Republic. This report that the bridge was burned five days ago deceived me. He held it three-quarters of an hour and wanted the good sense to burn it. They took up an indefensible position afterward instead of a defensible one. But notwithstanding all these blunders the men behaved nobly; left the ground in perfect order; brought off everything but the guns, which had to be abandoned, the horses being killed. Eight pieces they report abandoned. I had concerted a combined attack with General Fremont next day, which must have proved successful. The position and peremptory orders compelled me to come on. Please let General McDowell know that my artillery needs refitting, and to let me have the Napoleon guns if possible. I will have a perfect memorandum of our wants forwarded you from Luray as soon as I have time to halt.

JAS. SHIELDS,

Major-General, Commanding Division.

Colonel SCHRIVER.

HEADQUARTERS SHIELDS' DIVISION, Luray, Va., June 13, 1862-6.30 a. m.

The telegrams from General Banks* and giving extracts from Richmond papers received.

The engagement of Monday, the 9th instant, was between General Jackson's whole force and the advance of this division, under Brigadier-General Tyler, near Port Republic. The unequal contest was maintained successfully for four hours.

On Sunday, at 6.30 a. m., Colonel Carroll, leading a small body in advance, found Jackson's army and train on the opposite side of the river at Port Republic. The river was impassable, and the bridge across it still standing. By some unaccountable misapprehension he neglected to burn it, although he held possession of it three-quarters of an hour. The destruction of the bridge would have insured the destruction of Jackson's army, placing him between General Fremont and us, with an impassable river in his front. This first fundamental error was not redeemed afterward either by Colonel Carroll or General Tyler, who commanded the advance, by falling back at once upon a defensible position. On the contrary, they took up a position utterly indefensible, within 2 miles from Port Republic.

Jackson crossed his whole army over the bridge, thus left, as it were, for his use, on Sunday night and on Monday morning, and attacked our advance, consisting of about 2,500 men, with his whole force. The folly of attempting to hold such a position against such overwhelming odds was redeemed by the fearless and reckless courage of our troops.

They repulsed the enemy at every point for four hours. Our artillery hurled destruction through his ranks. The infantry drove the enemy back from the guns at the point of the bayonet. The artillerists stood to their guns, especially those of Captain Clark's battery (E), Fourth Artillery, until their horses were killed, and then defended themselves in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy's infantry, and were only compelled to abandon the field at length by a fatal mistake of General Tyler's in stripping the left flank of all infantry support. They then fell back in good order, carrying off all the guns except those whose

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*See pp. 543, 544.

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