results of the day. I regretted that I had not detained General Taylor until Major Barbour reached me, as with his brigade and my own the result would have been reasonably certain without consulting General Ewell.

Finally, convinced that we could make a successful night attack and disperse or capture General Fremont's entire force-certainly all his artillery-I awaited General Ewell's return, and then used more than ever the attack, and begged him to go with me and "see how easy it was." He said he could not take the responsibility, and if it was to be done I would have to see General Jackson. I accordingly rode 7 miles to see him, obtained his consent to have Colonel Patton's battalion co-operate with me and his directions "to consult General Ewell and be guided by him." On returning to General Ewell with this permission he declined taking the responsibility which he said thus rested on him, and continued, with General Taylor, to oppose it against with my brigade. He only replied, "You have done well enough for one day, and even a partial reverse would interfere with General Jackson's plans for the next day." I replied that we should have the army of Fremont pressing us to-morrow if not driven off, and that we had better fight one army at a time. So ended the matter.

My regiments remained under arms all night, and I moved to camp at daybreak with reluctance.

Having received orders to retard the advance of the enemy on the Port Republic road, on the 9th I took up our old position and remained until 9 o'clock, when, being without artillery and finding the enemy had placed a battery to drive us out of the wood where they had sustained so fatal a repulse the day before, I slowly retired toward Port Republic. Receiving form General Jackson two messages in quick succession to hasten to the battle-field where he had engaged General Shields' army, I marched rapidly to obey this order, crossed the bridge, burned it just before the enemy appeared, and reached the field after the contest had been decided in our favor.

To sum up the occurrences of the day, I may state that our handsome success on the right was due to the judicious position selected, as well as to the game spirit and eagerness of the men. The flank movement to the right, totally unexpected by the enemy and handsomely carried out by Colonel Cantey, completed our success, and although we failed to take their battery, it was not attributable to unskillful maneuvering, but to one of those accidents which often decide the result of battles and partial engagements.

To the bearing of all the officers (dismounted by my order except myself and staff) and the men I give most favorable testimony, and cannot withhold my highest admiration of their gallant conduct and fine discipline, and after the contest, as you witnessed, every regiment was in line, as composed as if they had been od drill. The prisoners and wounded say two brigades were opposed to us-General Blenker's old brigade (now Stahel's) and General Trin's [?], with reserves-probably not less than 6,000 to 7,000 men (one regiment having brought 800 men on the field), with two batteries of artillery. My three regiments, counting 1,348 men and officers, repulsed the brigade of Blenker three times, and one hour after, with the Thirteenth and Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiment-whose conduct while observed by me was characterized by steadiness and gallantry-the other brigade of the enemy, with their battery, was driven from the field, 1 1/2 miles from the first scene of the contest. On the ground where we first opened 290 of the