movements here set forth and all the information and assurances upon which these movements were made. On the 23rd I received a dispatch from the General-in-Chief, informing me that heavy re-enforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction the succeeding day, and on the 24th I received dispatches from Colonel Haupt, the railroad superintendent at Alexandria, informing me that 30,000 men, ordered forward to join me, had demanded transportation from him, and that they would all be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning. The force which I thus expected, as reported to me, consisted of the division of General Sturgis, 10,000 strong; the division of General Cox, 7,000 strong; the corps of General Heintzelman, 10,000 strong, and the corps of General Franklin, 10,000 strong.

By the night of the 25th it became apparent to me that I could no longer keep open my communications with Fredericksburg and oppose the crossing of the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station without abandoning the road from Warrenton to Washington and leaving open to the enemy the route through Thoroughfare Gap and all other roads north of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; and as the main body of his forces was constantly tending in that direction I determined no longer to attempt to mask the lower fords of the Rappahannock, but to assemble such forces as I had along the Warrenton turnpike between Warrenton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as he might choose. I therefore directed General McDowell to occupy Warrenton with his own and Sigel's corps, supporting him by Banks' corps from the direction of Fayetteville. I pushed Reno forward to occupy a point near the Warrenton turnpike and about 3 miles to the east of that town. I sent orders to General Porter, who had reported to me by note from the neighborhood of Bealeton Station, to push forward and join ReNumbers Heintzelman's corps, which had reached Warrenton Junction, was ordered to remain for the present at that point, it being my purpose to push forward that corps as soon as practicable to Greenwich, about half way between Warrenton and Gainesville. I sent orders to Colonel Haupt to direct one of the strongest divisions being sent forward to take post in the works at Manassas Junction, and requested General Halleck to push Franklin with all speed to Gainesville; that he could march quite as rapidly as he could be transported by rail with the limited means of railroad transportation in our possession, and that his baggage and supplies could be sent forward to Gainesville by rail. I also sent orders to the colonel commanding at Manassas Junction for the first division that reached there from Alexandria to halt and take post in the works at that place, and directed him also to push forward all of his cavalry in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, to watch any movements the enemy might make from that direction. I had instructed General Sturgis, commanding at Alexandria, on the 22nd of August, to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station, and requested him to superintend this in person. I also directed General Kearny, who reached Warrenton Junction on the 23rd, to see that sufficient guards were placed all along the railroad in his rear. After these precautions and assurances I thought and confidently expected that by the afternoon of the 26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville, one division would have been occupying the works at Manassas Junction, and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at Warrenton Junction, whence they could have at once been pushed north in the direction of Warrenton turnpike. The orders for the disposition of the forces then under my

3 R R - VOL XII, PT II