HARRISONBURG, October 1, 1864 - 10 a. m.

(Received 3rd.)

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

I have ordered General Wilson to report to Sherman. He is the best man for the position. I have devastated the Valley from Staunton down to Mount Crawford, and will continue. The destruction of mills, grain, forage, foundries, &c., is very great. The cavalry report to me that they have collected 3,000 head of cattle and sheep between Staunton and Mount Crawford. The difficulty of transporting this army through the mountain passes onto the railroad at Charlottesville is such that I regard at as impracticable, with my present means of transportation. The rebels have given up the Valley, excepting Waynesborough, which has been occupied by them since my cavalry was there. I think that the best policy will be to let the burning of the crops of the Valley be the end of this campaign, and let some of this army go somewhere else.

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Major-General.

HARRISONBURG, October 1, 1864 - 9.30 p. m.

(Received 3rd.)

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

A dispatch* just received from General Halleck, in which you expect me to reach Staunton or Charlottesville. I have been to Staunton and Waynesborough with the cavalry; destroyed the iron bridge on South River at Waynesborough, throwing it into the river; also the bridge over Christian's Creek, and the railroad from Staunton to Waynesborough. My judgment is taht it would be best to terminate this campaign by the destruction of the crops, &c., in this valley, and the transfer of the troops to the army operating against Richmond. If the Orange and Alexandria Railroad is opened, it will take an army corps to protect it. If the Front Royal road is opened, it will take as many troops to protect it, as there is no enemy in the Valley to operate against. Early is, without doubt, fortifying at Charlottesville, holding Rockfish Gap. It is no easy matter to pass these mountain gaps and attack Charlottesville, hauling supplies through difficult passes, fourteen miles in length, and with a line of communication from 135 to 145 miles in length, without the organization of supply trains, ordnance trains, and all the appointments of an army making a permanent advance. At present we are organized for a raid up the Valley, with no trains except the corps trains. All the regimental wagons had to be used as supply wagons to subsist us as far as this place, and can't do it at that. I am ready and willing to cross the Blue Ridge, but know from present indications that the enemy will strongly fortify at Charlottesville and Gordonsville of a largely superior force to keep open the line of communication. With my present means, I cannot accumulate supplies enough to carry me through to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Major-General.

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*See Halleck to Sheridan, September 28, p.196.

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