Eastern Shore Mayland Regiment to be at Baltimore by the 4th of November; the quartermaster to furnish them transportation; the regiments to be replaced at Martinsburg by others ordered by you from elsewhere. Acknowledge receipt.

E. D. TOWNDSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 26, 1864.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: We have the honor to report that, in obedience to your verbal instructions, give to us on the 17th instant, we have accompanied Major-General sheridan up the Valley of the Shenandoah, as far as Fisher's Hill, on the North Fork, and Front royal, on the South Fork, and, with him, have examined various points of occupation for the defense of that valley, including winchester, Va., and its vicinity; and that we have returned, continuing our examinations through Manassas Gap and along the railroad, to Washington. In our examinations and frequent interviews with General Sheridan, we have consulted with him fully about the occupation and defense of the Shenandoah Valley and the country east of the Blue Ridge, and, with his full and entire concurrence, have concurrence, have concluded to recommend as follows:

That there be two separate and distinct armies of 10,000 men each-one for the defense of the shenandoah Valley and the country immediately east of the Blue ridge, to be strongly entrenched on the Opequon River, near the Winchester and Potomac Railroad, and at he same time occupy in detachments Winchester, Snicker's Gap, and Ashby's Gap; that the position on the Opequon be selected with reference to its advantage from defense, on both banks, having several connecting bridges, with testes-de-pont, an arrangement having great advantages from the bold and rough character of the canons through which the Opequon flows. The second army, for the defense of Washington and the country east of Bull Run Mountains, it is recommended, should occupy an advanced position, strongly entrenched, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, near Manassas Junction or Bull Run, and at the same time hold the defenses around Washington. And, further, that both armies should have on hand large supplies of all kinds, in case of being besieged by a superior force.

This disposition of the two armies will enable them, at all times, to be supplied by short railroad lines of comparatively easy defense, and prevent a great waste and dispersion of troops for the protection of those roads. It will also afford a continuous railroad communication between the two armies, by which detachments can be sent from one to the other, or to intermediate points. This plan has objections, in its separation of the two armies, either of which the enemy may attack, as well as in the difficulty and delay that might arise in their concentration, should it become necessary; but it appears to us, after the examination of the country just made, viewed in connection with the recent successful operation of General Sheridan's army in the Valley of the Shenandoah, that it presents less objections than any other whit the some number of troops, unless General Sheridan army in the Valley of the Shenandoah, that it presents less objections that any other with the same number of troops, unless General Sheridan may be called upon to assume the offensive. Should this plan of de-