State. Indications are very strong that the rebels have it in contemplation to make a descent upon this (the Kanawha) valley, and, if possible, regain possession of it. Our outposts form Guyandotte to Gauley are now threatened and pressed by heavy and strong parties, while refugees from the mountain counties of Monroe, Raleigh, Fayette, Boone, Logan, and above, represent that great energy and activity are being put forth to fill the rebel armies by carrying the conscription rigorously into full execution. Since what I cannot but regard as discreditable repulse of Burbridge (from all that I can learn of that affair) there is nothings left to impede the progress of the rebel forces from that quarter, and our valley is about the only inviting field left to the rebel forces in the west, now said to be united, after plundering the northwest and driving Burbridge form the southwest. The way is open, and the task an easy one, to a force such as it is apprehended they have gathered up for the occasion. And it is hardly to be supposed that they lack the disposition or the energy to make the attempt, where a rich booty would repay their efforts.

To-day I had a confidential conversation with Colonel Oley, now in command here, and he fully concurs with me tin the propriety and necessity of a larger force in this now isolated quarter. There should be, at least, three regiments more, to make us sure against disaster. He suggested that if the Fifth, Ninth, and thirteenth could be returned here it would be best for the regiments, the country here, and at large. These regiments have suffered severely in the many hard and well fought battles in the Shenandoah Valley, and must need rest and recruiting, which could be accomplished here, while they guarded and held the country. If this cannot be effected can any other national troops be obtained promptly? If not, the next question is: Is this section of the State of sufficient importance, and the danger of invasion sufficiently great, to warrant, or even require, the State and State authorities to put forth her own energies (as the States under like circumstances have done) to repel the anticipated attack and defend her people and her borders? I confess I feel too deeply in a case like this to hesitate. It seems to me that we have the means of self-defense, and ought to use them with vigor till the danger is repelled and over, which cannot continue longer that a month, before the winter season will prevent the movement of large bodies of troops through the mountains. If it is asked, where are the men and metal to come from, can there be any doubt or difficulty in assembling three or four regiments of State militia promptly, and moved to this locality and vicinity, to act as a reserve and in conjunction with the national forces? I would not rashly nor unnecessarily annoy the citizens by calling them to arms; but when the occasion requires it, the whole should be ready and zealous to defend the parts. And I think it much wiser and better to repel invasion than pursue the retiring foe after the mischief is all done It is true the enemy has not fully developed his plan and intentions; but if we wait for that we shall never be prepared to counteract them. It seems to me that the Secretary of War, and others in authority, might be made to see and feel the justice and necessity of furnishing promptly the requisite aid. Whatever is done should be done promptly and vigorously. Will the new levies form this State even be allowed to this end? Will write you again in a few days if anything new in the premises transpires.

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

J. H. BROWN.