I knew the faul was not in the ordnance office in Charleston, and therefore said nothing about the matter, substituting one of Schulz's bronze rifles for the Parrott, feeling sure General Beauregard would approve the act.

In regard to the distance of the Marblehead from the middle battery when the action commenced, I am aware that Colonel PAGE thinks my estimate too great. My opportunities for judging of that distance were greatly superior to his, and I am sustained by all the officers under me. I ordered the 30 pounder to commence at 2 3/4o elevation, equivatent to almost 1,200 yards, and these shots fell short. I desire to remind you that in the report of my reconnaissance near Legareville on the 13th of December I avoided any allusion to the distances, because I then thought they were too great to render success by any means certain; but I conceived that the circumstances of the case rendered it unbecoming to say anything calculated to thrown obstacles in the way of the expedition. When about 7 o'clock I thought it advisable to withdraw from the engagement, I notified Colonel PAGE of my intention by a courier, who left me as orders we sent to bring one of Captain Webb's teams down to the battery, and this courier returned to be at the batteries just after the second Parrott gun was started, the howitzers still firing. I thus gave Colonel PAGE ample time to move from the field before or along with me, and when the 8-inch howitzers from the middle battery reached the Legareville road I was informed that Charles had passed up some time (at least fifteen minutes) previous, and that the infantry was retiring along the northern edge of the peninsula. My determination to withdraw was induced solely by the apparent entire inefficency of our fire, and not by the enemy's fire; our casualties all occured in rear of the batteries, where the horses were. I came to this conclusion on my own repsnsibility, it never occurring to me that I was to await Colonel PAGE's orders, and in this view of our relations I am sure he concurred. The withdrawal was effected very slowly and deliberately, one piece at a time, the others keeping up their fire, and I am sure fire from the 8-inch howitzers of the middle battery was maintained after Charles had left the field. In spite of the heavy (but not destructive) fire, it was certainly perfectly practicable to remove the two howitzers left at the batteries at the time I proposed to do so, viz, as soon as the others were somewhat out of the range of fire; and it will ever be a source of regret to me that I yielded to the advice of others, though I, of course, concurred with them at the time. Private Johnston, of siege train, was killed near the horses, in the edge of the woods, some 100 yards in rear of the middle battery and not at the battery. When I left the battery to go the lower one shortly after the last Parrott had been withdrawn, I passed near that point, but saw nothing of the body, which was doubtless concealed by the bushes under which some of the drivers took shelter, and only learned some hours after that it had been left. Having been informed before I left the island that the body had been recovered, I did not consider it necessary to remark the circumstance in my report. From a conversation held with Colonel PAGE on the night of the 24th I learned to my surprise that we differed in our interpretation of the paragraph of Special Orders, Numbers 276, directing the attack on the enemy's force in the village, Colonel PAGE contending that he was to await the destruction or crippling of the gun-boats to make that advance on the village, while I understood General Beauregard to order that advance as soon as the vessels were fairly engaged with the batteries. It was therefore agreed between us