advantage. As soon as I saw this position I felt that all hopes of withdrawing my guns to a more favorable position were gone, for the reason that the Eighth U. S. Colored were green troops, and should I have limbered to the rear I was sure they would run before the second line could come up to our support. As this line-Colonel Barton's brigade-was about deploying, I knew that the running of troops through or over them would subject us to an immediate defeat from the enemy's flaking line of cavalry to have been 500 strong. I was soon struck on the left hip, but not disabled. Then Lieutenant Eddy was baddly wounded; then my horse. I could pay almost no attention to my battery, which was being mowed down as grass without the power to reply with any effect. My whole attention was involved in holding the Eight on their ground. My heart bled for them; they fell as tempis in a bowling alley; but everything depended on their sacrifice and that of my battery until we could be relieved or the new line formed. In about twenty-five minutes, out of 82 men and 4 officers, 44 men and 3 officers were disabled, and 39 horses were hit so as to be left behind. Langdon's battery then took position on my left, and bleeding heavily, and sick, I directed Lieutenant Myrick to get off the pieces, and I reported to General Seymoru, who sent me off the field. Colonel Fribley had fallen, mortally wounded, some time before, and had been placed on the footboard of one of my limbers. I saw him dead, and directed one of his officers to take him off, as I had to use the limber to get off one of my guns. He was placed about twenty-five feel to the right and rear of my right piece, where I think he was left. I do not think that we, on the left, did much hurt to the enemy. Our time was occupied in filling gaps; my pieces were marred by the infantry commingling with my own men. The left wing of the U. S. Colored Infantry could have done little injury to the enemy; they fired very wildy and without purpose. It was not from cowardice as much as ignorance. Their officers appeared to do their duty as brave men, but without self-reliance, and I did not see any of the regiment run, yet they only served the purpose of keeping the enemy in check from charging. They should not be condemned, for I saw nothing wrong that could not be accounted for by want of experience and ingorance of object, apparently. My own men behaved well, devotedly, and individually so. My attached "Enfans Perdus" did not. They clustered and gabbled in all languages; some were punished.

It was impossible at the time of removing to a second line to bring off two pieces and two caissons for want of horses or cannoneers. I regret to say they were left to the enemy with nearly full ammunition chests. All my officers were hit, four of us severely wounded, and the charge of the battery fell into the hands of Lieutenant D. Irwin, Third Rhode Island Artillery, serving with the battery. As chief of artillery I can make no report than can be so called. I had to act on the line of infantry as a general staff officer. This is to be the more regretted, for could I have had the directing of Langdon's battery it would not have taken the position it did. I had not even time to communicate with the general. But personally I have nothing to regret. By the sacrifice of five pieces of artillery I saved the whole of our left flank from breaking and its disastrous consequences. We thus changed a rout into a simple defeat or beating back. For the dead, a very large majority died honorable; the wounded have all the sympathy a wounded man can extend. My thanks are due to Lieutenant Irwin for his labors.