all of which make it a most convenient harbor of refuge, and its being securely held by the possession of a single point. With regard to Saint Helena Sound and Port Royal Bay there is more room for doubt. We have compared the two somewhat as follows: If Port Royal has the greater depth on the bar (twenty-three to twenty-five feet), yet the bar of the former is eight miles from the land, while that of the latter is only three miles and a half. Saint Helena is held by the occupation of a single point. Port Royal requires that three points shoudl be taken and fortified. The entrance of the former is six miles wide, and the best channel can only be molested from Hunting Island; that of the latter is only two miles wide, and the attacking fleet will be subject to fire from both sides. The resources for wood and water are about the same in each. Saint Helena is more central between Charleston and Savannah; Port Royal commands a larger interior communication and trade. The noble bay of Port Royal comprises one large open space, capable of containing any number of vessels anchored in one body. The anchorages of Saint Helena are divided and distrinct from each other. It seems to us that Saint Helena ought to be seized before Port Royal, because it will be so much more easily taken and held. The former is a comparatively obscure place, little known and but little resorted to, while the latter is constantly talked of as the first point of attack, and is closely looked after.

Stephen Elliott, Jr., of Parry's Island, a nephew of George P. Elliott, has been employed in fortifying Port Royal, every foot of which he is familiar with, while not a planter knows Saint Helena.

Finally, believing that the three points we have recommended will suffice for the purposes of coaling stations and harbors of refuge for the blockading squadrons, we are not disposed to recommend any immediate measures for the taking of Port Royal. The putting of 12,000 or 15,000 men thus in the immediate neighborhood of Charleston and Savannah and the presence of a considerable fleet in this noble harbor would doubtless be a sore annoyance to the rebels, and necessitate the constant maintenance of large forces in those cities and on those shores. Yet the same force, naval and military, organized as an expeditiion and held in hand at New York for a blow anywhere, would threaten not only Savannah and Charleston, but the whole Southern coast.

If, in the organization of such a force, its destination should be absolutely undefined, the threat wold be equally against every important point of the Southern coast from Hatteras to the Rio Grande. The simple putting to sea of such a force, if it were only to return to its port, would cause general alarm, and the Gulf States could no longer permit their troops to swell the armies of Virginia. The force thus organized, after being, by frequent embarkations and disembarkations, used as a means of threat, and thus perfectly drilled to its intended service, might at last be permitted to strike its blow. Whether at New Orleans, or Mobile, or Pensacola, or Savannah, or Port Royal, or that focus of rebellion-the scene of the great indiginity offered our flag-Charleston, might be decided at the last moment.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

S. F. DU PONT,

Captain, U. S. Navy, President.

A. D. BACHE,

Superintendent U. S. Coast Survey.

J. G. BARNARD,

Major, U. S. Engineers.

CHAS. H. DAVIS,

Commander, U. S. Navy, Secretary.

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