and may not be successful. Meade can only advance by pushing Lee from one river to another, each of which will be as strongly defended as the Rappahannock and the James. It is hardly probable that such advance will be much more easily made hereafter than in the past. But between Charleston and Savannah are excellent harbors, deep streams penetrate to the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and from many points of this railroad it is only forty miles to Branchville, S. C.,both the grand routes between Lee and Johnston are effectually occupied by us. If our force is large enough to push on to Augusta, Savannah will fall of itself; and Charleston will also fall soon after Branchville is occupied, and Charleston will lfall in no other way.

*Map.

There is no reason why this operation should not be made immediately. Fifty thousand men are required to commenceit. Lee and Johnston must detach large forces to prevent the most secure method of weakening them. South Carolina would be converted into the battle field of the war, and probably, eventually, Bragg's (Johnston's) and Lee's armies would appear on this field. Meanwhile, we are occupying and fortifying strong positions, in which we could securely await attack; and at all times the base (in these sea-coast islands) is the best possible, and supplies can be furnished by sea in the shortest and cheapest possible manner. In this region of pine roads are always good, the country

7 R R-VOL LIII