The Florida convention was in session the next day, when I received from Governor Perry, of Florida, a dispatsch stating that he would take the forts in that State as soon as he could organize the necessary force. Governor Moore, of Alabama, also responded that he would co-operate immediately. Within a week alfter this time I heard that Governor Moore had occupied Fort Morgan, near Mobile, and that Governor Perry had occupied Fort Clinch and taken possession of the Chattahoochee Arsenal. He did not, however, occupu Forts Pickens, Taylor, or Jefferson.

My telegram to Governor Moore, of Louisiana, was sent to New Orleans, and I got no response. I waited a day or two and sent another dispatch for Governor Moore to Governor Pettus, of Mississippi, with request that the forward it to him, as I did not know at what point to direct to him. Governor Pettus replied, approving my course, and promised to send the dispatch to Governor Moore. But few days passed after this before I heard of the seizure of the forts in Louisiana.

Afer I returned from Savannah to Milledgeville, I sent a dispatch to Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, requesting him to seize the forts in that State. He replied, giving resons why he could not them do so. After the State convention met at Milledgeville, a resolution was introduced by Mr. Toombs, and passed unanimously, approving my course in the seizure of the fort.

I have thought it my duty, to myself and others, to put this statement in some permanent from for preservation. I have therefore ordered it to be place upon the Executive Minutes upon a blank left for it under date of 2nd January, 1861.

JOSEPH E. BROWN.

[1.]

CHARLESTON, S. C., January 2, 1860 [1861.]

His Excellency Governor PICKENS:

SIR: I have the honor to state that in obedience to your order dated 1st instant I immediately reported to Colonel Pettigrew at Castle Pinckney, who, having explained his plan of defense against such attack as he considered the most probable and imminet, directed me to examine the work and suggest plans with a view to its defense. The work is so far distant from Fort Sumter that it perhaps would not sustain very great damage from its guns until after a long cannonade; and against Fort Sumter, as also against the guns of ships of war (an enemy bei of the other posts in the harbor), very little, if anything, can be done to protect it. The chief apprehension of the commanding officer is, I think justly, from an attack by assualt and escalade by troops from Frot Sumter, when fully manned, or from other position within the harbor or in the neighborohood in the occupation of an enemmy. A marsh lies to the north and a shoal to the east of the fort, both of which can be traversed by an assaulting party, and with a view to this, bastioned stockades had may years ago been erected for the protection of the work upon those quarters. The chief expense will be in repairing and extending those stockades, which are now much dilapidated; also in giving as much as possible some flank-fire to the castle, of which it is entirely deficient; also in protecting the gateway by a stockade lunette. I propose to build a wooden fraize around the parapet to check an escalade, and do soundry other items of work which will be needed. Chiefly in consequence of the castle being destitute of flank-fire, it is exceedingly weak, and in consequence of its proximity to the city and central