lines of defensive operations, as James Island and Mount Pleasant, and we matarially diminish the expenses; the troops will be salubriously quartered, and we shall avoid the inevitable sickenss already making its appearance, due to great exposure, insufficient commissariat, and bad water.

Fort Sumter cannot be retaken from Morris Island alone. Your mortar batteries have accomplished that work. It cannot be touched from Cummings Point; the late bombardment shows that. Let the enemy occupy it entirely. We can shell him out from remaining mortar batteries and keep him at a distance. If the Stono is taken by the enemy, we must move our troops. We shall be able to concentrate a strong force for the defense of Sumter, since, even in its present condition, Sumter cannot be retaken. The evacuation of Morris Island, if agreed on, should proceed while we are restoring the fort, and at once, before the enemy has recovered from his present repluse and has made his appearance with greatly increased force and resources. He is not and cannot be ready to make a landing for permanent lodgment now, nor, in spite of the press, has he the force. It took more than six months to prepare for Vera Cruz. The object here is more difficult than that, for it is to invade American soil. In the twenty days which Mr. Lincoln so kindly gives us to "throw down our arms and disperse", suppose we move and disconcert their plans. If so, the move to being with the dismantling of the siege batteries, already ordered; the south and to be abandoned, as you directed; the whole force to dismount and transport the guns; the troops to be gradually withdrawn, a regiment covering the island until its time came to leave. The move will require a rapid and well-organized arrangement of the steamers and land transportation. As for the defenses of Charleston Harbor, Moultri and Sumter, even as it is, are enough and more than sufficient.

I hope you will not consider this as ill-timed or impertiment; and, as I believe that (more elaborated and matured) this has been your plan, although you have not disclosed it, I have therefore written you this as a private letter or conversion, not to be filed. I am free to confess that the idea never occurred to me till and hour ago, suggested by General Simson, while weighing in my mind the two plans of action embraced in your letter of the 16th, relative to abandoning the southern end of the island, and that of the 16th, suspending it. Have to say, also, that if the movement is but the preliminary to evacuation of the entire island, it has now, as it did not have yesterday, my entire concurence.

Very truly, yours,

W. H. C. WHITING.

P. S.- Besides, it would greatly favor the assistance we can afford to North Carolina and Pensacola, as much of our armament can be spared. This consideration is very important. I could devote my attention to Sumter, where I think my presence is needed.

[6.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Montgomery, April 17, 1861.

His Excellecny JOSEPH E. BROWN,

Milledgeville, Ga.:

SIR: I have the honor acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instnat, inclosing copies of two ordinances adopted by the State of Georgia in reference to the transfer to this Government of the