exposure of Florida, but few States will need as many forces for defense if in the progress of the war Florida shall command that consideration of the enemy which to an able commander-in-chief, who desired the subjugation of the South or the abolition of slavery, would present itself; and I would respectfully suggest that unless General Lee can give his personal attention to the defenses of Florida that General Trapier should be authorized to make requisition for the forces, arms, &c., which from personal observation his judgment may suggest to be necessary.

Permit me again, most respectfully, to invite your attention to the defenseless condition of this place (the capital of the State), and to submit to your considereation the importance of its defense. At this time the force in arms for its defense is one infantry company of fifty-seven men at Saint Mark's, a coast guard of about eighty men on duty from the mouth of Crooked River to the East Pass off Apalachicola, State forces, and three companies of cavalry, not fitly armed and equipped, in Confederate service. I have invited the attention of General Trapier to the facts and requesed him to order a regiment to be stationed near here for the defense of the place. It is perhaps the most important part of the State to defend, but all parts are important enough to reqsuire defense. Why is it the most important? Not simply because it is sthe capital of the Sate, but it may be consideraed the central spot of our slave population, and if in the possession of the enemy would be a place of refuge for slaves from adjacent counties in Georgia, where slaves are numerous, and there is more dissatisfaction among slaves in this and adjoining counties than other parts of the State. The enemy are convenient to them and they know it. But it has been said that if the enemy should capture Tallahassee they could be easily driven off or captured, and that the enemy know the fact. I cannot undertake to say what the enemy know or believe, but I believe, and therefore inform you, that the enemy could not at this time be prevented from capturing Tallahassee, if commanded by a skillful officer, although the force under his command might not exceed 5,000 men. Troops can be landed upon our coast at places unprotected, and by a forced march of ten hours capture Tallahassee. Moreover, if the enemy deemed it important to hold possession, they could loss of life. their facilities for concentrating troops and munitions of war would greatly exceed the means of the Confederate Government. Theey would be near the coast, with a railroad at their command leading from Saint Mark's to the capital, a distance of only twenty-one miles. What means would the Confederate Goverrnment have of concentrating forces, arms, and munitions of war to rout the enemy? None by railroads, steamboats, or vessels of any kind; hence the great military necessity of continuing the Pensacola and Georgia Railroad from Quincy to Chattahoochee River, a distance of twenty-ttwo miles, where, being connected with ssteam-boats from Columbus, Ga., the transportation of forcs, arms, and munitions of war could be accomplished promptly and comparatively att little expense. Permit me again to invite your attention to the proposition to defend certain points heretofore designated to you by previous correspondence, at the expense of the Confederate Government, bacause the State has not the means to support the troops necessary, or of retiring the State troops and yilding the defense of the State entirely to forces in Confederate service except