when organized. Those districts from which a large ortion of the militia will be drawn will not have left enough labor to plant and cultivate the crops requisite to supply them with provisions. Moreover, the troops, when organized, will be but raw militia, individually brave, but undisciplined. Whilst I shall cheerfully do all in my power to aid with the militia, the successful defense of the coast will need veterans, to provide re-enforcements for the defense of Charleston.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. L. BONHAM.

[14.]

HEADQUARTERS STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Columbia, February 10, 1863.

Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON,

Secretary of War:

SIR: My letter of the 8th instant in reference to the negro labor act may mislead. The amended act ratified the 6th of February directs the Executive to furnish the labor, notwithstanding the Confederate Government has not assented and agreed to be liable for loss and damage of negroes; but the State does not waive its right to insist upon such liability, and I am instructed to bring the matter before Congress. I inclosed you a certified copy of the amended act on the 8th instant asking your assent to the other provisions, which please answer as soon as practicable.

I have the honor to be, very resectfully, your obedient servant,

M. L. BONHAM.

[14.]

HEADQUARTERS,
Augusta, February 10.1863.

Brigadier General T. JORDAN,

Chief of Staff, &c., Charleston, S. C.:

GENERAL: I deem it proper to draw the attention of the commanding general to the defenses of the Savannah River below Augusta, so that being possessed of the data he may take such action, if any should be required, as may be deemed by him dvisable. Last winter I was instructed by General Lee, then in commnand, to put up such batteries and obstructions on the Savannah River below this city as I might find practicable for its ultimate defense, the great importance of the Government powder-works, arsenal, and foundry and machine-works, in addition to the immense supply of cotton here stored, making it of the first importnce that every step should be taken for their preservation. At that time the defenses of the city of Savannah were feeble, and the fall of Fort Pulaski would unmask the city and river to the enemy; the forces were inadequate to the defense, and none could be spared for the upper river. No artillery could be spared, nor small-arms supplied. Such were the conditions upon which the general reluctantly was compelled to leave the upper river defenses to my charge to protect Augusta from a raid by the river, then high in its stage of water, and though abruptly winding and nrrow in its channel, still capable of being ascended without serious difficulty by gun-boats. With the assistance