the force at their disposal for the accomlishment of colonel Heyward's object. Also a communication from General Beauregard, through his adjutant-general, to General W. S. Walker,* with a copy of General Walker's circular annexed thereto, urging the citizens of that section to remove their property beyond a certain line therein mentioned, which can be easily traced upon a map. Also extracts from a letter of an intelligent officer in the service to a private citizen, which I cite simply to show the inadequacy of the force in that portion of the State. The falling behind the line indicated will be the abandonment to the enemy of the finest cotton and provision regions of South Carolina and of a line possessing more advantages for defense, with a proper force, than that proposed to be occuied, and will expose Charleston and Savannah, it seems to me, almost certainly to siege and capture. It would be easier to prevent the enemy efecting a permanent lodgment upon the mainland than it will be to dislodge him after he has established him self. Under these circumstances I write to urge upon you in the most earnest manner the importance of incresing the force so manifestly inadequate to the protection of that section of the country.

Very respectfully, yours,

M. L. BONHAM.

[inclosure Numbers 1.]

CHARLESTON, November 20, 1863.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

GENERAL: As a property holder on the neck of land between the Ashepoo and Combahee Rivers, permit me in behalf of myself and

neighboring planters, while thanking you for the interest and attention bestowed upon the defense of the low country of South Carolina, to solicit the return of some of the pieces of ordnance removed from positions near the entrances of these rivers at the beginning of the sickly season last spring. In view of the pending threat of an attack we regard the presence of a few effective guns exceedingly important to effect the repulse of the enemy from a region not merely rich in produce, but not insignificant in a military aspect. A lodgment of this neck by the foe would ruin this section, and it would open the country to the devstation of raids, the interior of the State and the South Carolina Railroad to the advances of the enemy upon the rer of Charleston, requiring an army to watch continually and keep him in check. It appears to our unmilitary eyes the most economical plan to defeat the first attempt at gaining a foothold on the main. We respectfully submit that one or two rifled 24-pounders in position to command the Ashepoo, and the same number on the Combahee and Cheraw where they unite, might defeat the expedition and save after consequences fatal to the low country and dangerous to Charleston. We are under the impression that such funs are in this department, perhaps on Sullivan's Island, where they can be of no use against iron-clads. An additional support of mounted infantry from either Rutledge's or Anderson's regiment, and another battery of field artillery, if compatible with your views of the importance of defeating the projected lodgment, would add, we believe, very much to the certainty of the result.

Having made bold to brint to your attention these views, and asking your favorable consideration, I remain, general, your most obedient servant,

NATHANIEL HEYWARD.

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*See Feilden to Walker, November 30, 1863, VOL. XXVIII, Part II, p.530.

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