man to remove all the men whose are and physical strength fit them for soldiers within the line, indicated in General Beauregard's letter. This line runs from Charleston in the rear of Ashepoo River to its headwaters, thence in the rear of Edisto River to Branchville, thence along the southern boundary of Barnwell District to the Savannah River.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. WALKER,

Brigadier-General, commanding

[Inclosure No. 3.]

POCOTALIGO, December 3, 1863.

* * * * * *

The raid of the enemy a few days ago is the immediate cause of this communication. Such demonstration cannot be prevented by the force here, and in 99 cases of 100 the enemy will be enabled to escape without punishment. The extent of coast from the Ashepoo to the Savannah is very great, and the distance ridden over necessarily by General Walker's inspector of outpost in making a single round is 450 miles on an exact calculation. The whole of this vast extent of outpost is accessible everywhere and is cut up and intersected throughout by streams, woods, and marshes. What force has General Walker under his command for this (outpost) duty? Two regiments of cavalry furnishing habitually about 1,400 effective men; one-fourth for outposts at a time. Everything that can be done under these circumstances is to guard the main avenues of approach along which the enemy might make a serious attack. This, you perceive, leaves unguarded miles and miles of coast, along which the enemy may penetrate in small parties without encountering a sentry. Once through the outposts there is no obstacle in their way to the plantations until they reach Old Pocotaligo or the depot. Patrolling parties serve but little to prevent their movements, and in this affair the other night it is well ascertained that the pickets' rounds visiting outposts passed within a few yards of the whole Yankee party, who stepped aside into the woods and allowed them to go by, wishing to avoid observation an being afraid, they said, that if they attempted capture one might escape and give alarm. Our force is so small as scarcely to afford outlying sentries. It is impossible to establish interior picket-posts.

Now, when you consider that an army like General Lee's, of 50,000 to 100,000 men, the front is not often wider than thirty or forty miles and yet that scouts from either side penetrate almost daily the lines of the other, what chance have we? Moreover, for your information, I can tell you that although the Yankee outpost line is not over sixty miles, and their force quadruple ours, nevertheless our scouts are among them continually, and but a few days before the raid one was within three miles of Beaufort for some time, and another within 400 yards of Hilton Head. There is not a picket of their which we cannot capture or destroy at any time should it be an object. Another disadvantage we suffer from here is the constant communication which is unquestionably kept up between the negroes on the plantations and the runaways with the Yankees; and these latter furnish the best guides in the world. Not a change of a picket-post is made but that they know it in a short time. Such is the general condition of affairs in this district. We are liable incessantly to these night raids, knowing the impossibility of preventing them, and the certainty of public censure