place would previously have been more or less closely invested by the enemy's cavalry and light troops.

I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the topography of the vicinity of that city to venture to state where will be the true point of attack, but rest assured that Major-Generals Sherman and McPherson, able and dangerous adversaries, and Gillmore (who probably is now on his way to Mobile) will not commit any material error in its selection, and that, all other things being equal, they will attack a point as near their base as practicable. The reduction of Mobile will probably consume about four weeks longer, or about two or three months in all from the arrival at Pascaguola of Shermans' army. This estimate of time is necessity a very rough one and should only be received as such. The enemy would next push his columns forward up the Alabama River to Selma, Montgomery, and Atlanta, so as to attack or threaten Johnston in the rear, whilst Grant, with overpowering numbers, will advance in his front from Chattanooga. Will Johnston be prepared to meet successfully such odds against him? I fear that he would necessarily be compelled in the direction of Augusta and Macon, abandoning to the enemy all that rich extent of country in North Alabama and Northwest Georgia. We would then be separated from the Trans-Mississippi Department by the immense belt of country extending from the Mississippi River to the Apalachicola, the Chattahoochee up to about Columbus, thence along a line running northeasterly, passing in advance of Macon and Augusta. Should the enemy meantime succeed in throwing a large force into Florida that State wold also be cut off from the Confederacy, when, unless something favorable should turn up (from what quarter I cannot imagine), we shall be reduced by the end of spring to the possession of about one-half of Georgia, the whole of South Carolina (I hope), North Carolina, and a part of Virginia. A sad picture, indeed, to contemplate, and on that I shall not dwell longer for fear of being considered by you an augur of ill omen.

Before closing it has occurred to me to add that if it be now too late to concentrate a sufficient force in West Virginia to delay, as suggested, the movements of Sherman's army, could not Generals Johnston and Longstreet take boldly the offensive to strike at Grant whilst his forces are scattered and weakened by the corps he must have sent off with Sherman? I also send you herewith for your information a copy marked B of two telegrams.* You are authorized to use this letter as you may deem proper.

Hoping that we may soon have the pleasure of seeing you here again, I remain, yours, truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

[35.]

RICHMOND, VA., February 21, 1864.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Charleston, S. C.:

Your dispatch received.+ The requisition made upon you was based upon your last return, which gave your effective total as 30,000. Recent intelligence indicated that the enemy had withdrawn forces from your front. What aid can you give General Johnston in his present emergency?

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[32 and 35.]

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*Not found and inclosures.

+See VOL. XXXII, Part II, p.772.

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