now in our possession it is not possible to lay down fixed rules as to the organization and employment of such forces, and an attempt at details would serve to restrict your judgment and diminish your usefulness. You must bear prominently in mind, however, in making dispositions of your command for the safety of the State, that the agricultural and other industrial interests of the country are vital and must be interfered with as little as possible. To this end your forces should be organized as "minute-men" into companies, battalions, and regiments, to be called into, active service with the greatest promptitude only upon invasion or other apparent emergency. It will probably be found expedient not to call out at the same time all the reserves from the same section of the country, and under this view you will have carefully to exercise your disrection in the selection of those who can be spared with the least injury to the wants of the community and the interests of the country. You will report directly to the Adjutant and Inspector General at Richmond, Va. With these very general ideas I intrust this important matter to your hands, feeling assured that you will use your best endeavors to give satisfaction to the people of South Carolina, and, as best you may, to carry out the purpose of the Government in this effort to defend the State without embarrassing the active operations of our armies in the field or diminishing the productive capacity of the country.

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[35.]

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH MILITARY DISTRICT, DEPT. OF S. CAROLINA, Georgia, AND FLORIDA, James Island, S. C., May 8, 1864.

Captain FEILDEN,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor most earnestly to call the attention of the major-general commanding to the condition of this military district, and to urge the absolute importance of having additional troops sent here. I have already, when my strength was much more than twice as great as it now, urged, this, and the major-general commanding is respectfully referred to a communication of 9th ultimo addressed to department headquarters for a detailed statement of the situation, the number of batteries, the extreme length of picket-lines, the necessity of subdividing this command into fractions, the inability to re-enforce without extreme hazard one from the other, the impossibility of concentration on a threatened point, the near proximity of the enemy, their inability to concentrate unobserved, and their power to throw a force in boats under cover of night immediately upon the base of our works. I have not, when Colquitt's brigade leaves, with the exception of a few detached men of Hagood's, a single infantry soldier left, where I think it essential to have at least one brigade. There are upon this island 112 heavy guns in position. It is fair to estimate ten men and non-commissioned officers to the guns as being the least that could be relied upon; for two gun detachments to the gun, and with the heaviest guns, this is insufficient. On this estimate it will require 1,120 men to man the guns in position. I have now, including the companies ordered to be disbanded and those now leaving for the conscript camp from over maximum companies, only 1,341 heavy artillerists. I have three companies siege train designed to be used in any part of the department, numbering 351 men. These I have been compelled to use as