of the reserves with a view to placing them all in the field. The large number of unarmed men arriving from the Army of Tennessee has absorbed all the arms reserved for the detailed men, and this in connection with the pressing need of their services were employed, has induced me to revoke my order in regard to them. The withdrawal of the brigade sent from General Lee's army to arrest deserters leaves the people of the State so entirely exposed to depredations that I have also ordered two regiments of the Senior Reserves back to the duty of arresting deserters.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

TH. H. HOLMES,

Lieutenant-General.

[47.]

RALEIGH, N. C., March 26, 1865.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT, &c.:

Mr. PRESIDENT: Since my note from near Smithfield a change has been made in my position. Finding myself with nothing but a small division in the field, and virtually ignored in regard to that and all other command, orders being constantly sent to my subordinates without notifications to me, I asked and was allowed to turn over Hoke's division to him. I have retired to this point where I have nothing to do but mourn over the sad spectacle hourly presented of disorganization, demoralization, and destruction. The condition, Mr. President, cannot be exaggerated, and no language can paint it. All three corps of the Army of Tennessee are up, and our infantry now foots about as followed, effective: Hoke's command (Department of North Carolina) of Tennessee, 3,500, including reserves; Hardee, 5,000; Army of Tennessee, 3,500. About 5,000 stragglers from the latter are reported coming with S. D. Lee somewhere in the rear. The balance of the men are scatered over the States of North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, living at free quarters on the people. It is a most sad and humiliating picture. Officers seem paralyzed, men indifferent to everything but plunder, and the people, as they well may, appear disgusted and dismayed. This state of things cannot last, and no one is so blind as not to see the inevitable result. A few days since, on the field, I passed poor Walthall-noble soldier-and inquired for his command. He pointed me to a small squad and said, "My division now numbers two brigadiers and sixty-three men for duty." His is a sample of the whole, and nothing better may be expected as long as every household is invaded, every private right violated, without the hope of redress. The people are disheartened and do not see what more can happen from the enemy. It is most distasteful, I know, for you to hear such things and have no remedy suggested. My own anomalous position, however, requires explanation, and I feel you are not allowed to see the whole truth when it is so important you should know all. You hear of victories and routs. I see disasters, disorderly retreats, and uter confusion on our front, with combinations and numbers against us which must prevail. To confront our 12,000 effectives, as they are erroneously called, Sherman now has an army at Goldsborough, including Schofield's and Terry's corps, of not less than 50,000. General Johnston thinks 60,000. What have we to hope from any conflict? When meeting only two corps our whole force suffered so as to be compelled to withdraw. We lost at leas three to their one, and were forced to a disorderly retreat when four corps commenced a concentration, barely escaping capture en route. With no duty to perform,

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*For reply, see VOL. XLVII, Part II, p. 1453.

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