there, ready to make the attack in front as soon as General Rosecrans performed his part of the programme and attacked the main work in the rear. I at once reported to General McClellan that I had succeeded in finding such a position as he desired, and had blazed a practicable road to it, and with 400 men I thought I could make the road before dark, it then being about 5 p. m. the working party was detailed from the Fourth Regiment, the men who had accompanied me up the hill being too much exhausted to do work, I very soon found that with my fresh men the work could be completed before the time I had specified, the route bing much better than I had at first thought it was. After the work was more than half done I left the whole in charge of Colonel McCook, who had joined me with twenty pioneers of the Ninth Regimtne, and reported to General McClellan that if he ordered the battery forward I could put it in position the same evening. While the road was being made the enemy, hearing heated chopping, fired several rounds of canister amongst the working party, but soon ceased firing, as they could not tell what effect their shots had. It showed us two things, however- that they knew we were cutting a road by which to establish a battery upon their left flank, and that our position was well chosen. Its site is fixed upon the sketch, and a dotted line leading to it from the main road showing the general direction of the road we made. The enemy during the latter part of the afternoon had been very jubilant, to judge from the cheers which proceeded from their lines, as well as the speech making which we distinctly heard, which, together with the failure of General Rosecrans to attack the rear, as had been arranged, led us to believe that he had been repulsed. Under these circumstances I was directed to finish the road and to leave at the site of the battery a sufficient number of men to hold it, an to lead Captain Howe's battery (Company G, Fourth Artillery) to the spot at an early hour in the morning. The Ninth Regiment, under Colonel McClook, bivouacked upon the ground, a drenching rain pouring upon them all night. In the morning, while I was waiting for Captain Howe to get ready to move with his battery, a dragoon rode into camp and up to headquarters. I recognized him as a member of the mounted company that had accompanied General Rosecrans. He informed me that he had ridden through the enemy's works, which had been evacuated during the night. I informed General McClellan, who directed me to ride forward and ascertain the truth of the statement. I did so, and found the position already occupied by General Rosecrans. I rode to the highest point of the works and saw that the battery site was only about 500 yards from there, and commanded it by at least sixty feet. A single glance was sufficient to show the cause of their hurried retreat. The battery, as the sketch will show, would have had an oblique fire upon one face, a reverse fire upon another, and would have completely enfiladed their longest line. With one battery in position (they supposed it was) their works were untenable. The sketch was reduced from one of their own, captured in the tent of their enditions were made by myself after their retreat. Their position, naturally a strong one, was weakened by constructing lines of near one- third of a mile in length when they had only 1,800 men to defend them with, as well as their total neglect of the commanding point of which I have been speaking. For 150 yards in width they had cut the heavy timber in front of their line. The limbs were allowed to remain, and with their dense foliage, yet green, would have made an excellent cover for an attacking party. Indeed, I think that instead of strengthening their defenses, they weakened the, as no difficulty would have