case you should find it impossible to move your heavy artillery, you are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages. Couch's command will move under your orders. communicate these instructons to him at once. The corps of Heintzelman and Sumner will move next. Please communicate to General Heitzelman the time of your moving. Additional gun boats, supplies, and re-enforcements will be met at Harrison's Bar. Stimulate your men by informing them that re-enforcements, &c., have arrived at our new base.

By command of Major - General McClellan:

JAMES A. HARDIE,

Lieutenant Colonel, Aide - de - Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. General

[11.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
James River, July 1, 1862.

Flag - Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH,

Commanding North Atlantic Squadron:

SIR: I would most earnestly request that every gun boat or other armed vessel suitable for action in the James River be sent at once to this vicinity and placed under the orders of Commander Rodgers for the purpose of covering the camps and communications of this army. May I urge that not and hour be lost, and that you telegrapg to the Navy Derpartment reporting the request I made. If this is illegible, I must offer as an excuse the extreme exhaustion under which I am laboring.

Very truly, yours.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major -General, Commanding.

[11.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, D. C., July 1, 1862 - 10. 26 a. m.

Brigadier - General STONEMAN,

Numbers 31 Cathedral Street, Baltimore:

The Secretary of War desires you to report yourself to him at the Department by the first train form Baltimore.

C. P. WOLCOTT,

Assistant Secretary of War.

[11.]

HEAQUARTERS,

Baltimore, July 1, 1862 - 2.30 p. m.

[Received 3. 30 p. m.]

Major General JOHN POPE:

I have just received your two telegrams of this day. I am decidedly in favor of breaking up the small commands in the interior and distant from the main depot of forces. As I mentioned to Brigadier - General Kelley, small forces at unsupportable distances from the main forces is generally a losing game with an enterprising enemy within striking distance. I made the remark from the fact that some sixty cavalry captured but three or four days since 54 men at Moorefield, and that Petersburg was thought to be in danger, where we had 200 men. I most cordially approve of all you propose. It may be neseccary to