that General Sumner's command did actually move to seize "those heights on the crest in rear of the town," almost as soon as I did. At that time I had not only not taken the position at Captain Hamilton's, but was crossing troops from the other side of the river to save those who had been sent to make the attempt. General Burnside was informed of all this by General Hardie as the effort progressed. How, then, is it to be accounted for that General Burnside could have so far forgotten his intentions as to say "that he did not inend making the attack on the right until that position (my position) had been taken?" If he did not intend to do so, why did he make the attack before the contingency happened? He knew that the position on the left was not taken; why, then, did he order General Sumner forward if his intention was to keep him back until it was taken? If he did not intend that General Sumner should move until I had taken the heights at Captain Hamilton's, what does this language in his order to me mean - "he has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view of seizing the heights on both of those roads? Holding these heights with the heights near Captain Hamilton's will, he hopes, &c. He makes these moves by column, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog."

This is the language of a simultaneous movement, and that no doubt may be left about it, he gives as a reason why he keeps the moving columns distant from each other that they might not encounter each other in a fog. If both columns were not to be moved at the same time it is difficult to see how they could have colided in a fog. It is, therefore, perfectly evident that under both orders issued that morning by General Burnside he imagined that he could seize certain heights over two miles distant from each other with the comparatively small force of a division sufficiently supported for each column, and that when these were taken he expected to follow up by orders for a main attack with the "whole command," which I was to keep in "position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." In the execution of these orders the enemy discovered himself in force so much greater than General Burnside anticipated that the plan proved totally inadequate to its expected results. The disaster which the mind of the commanding general must have been subjected since that time, it is not difficult to find a reason why his present recollection of his plan differs to matterially from the orders which he gave before the movement was made, but I submit that is an insufficient reason for visiting the consequences of the failure upon his subordinates in command.

After reciting the order, the committee state that when last before them I considered the meaning of the order to be an armed observation to ascertain was. They then proceed as follows:

In his (Franklin's) testimony given when your committee were at Falmouth he says: "I put in all the troops that I thought it prudent and proper to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command as far as I could and at the same time keep my connection with the river open."

These two statements seen to be present under the idea that they convict me of an inconsistency, and in the report furnished by the committee to one of the newspapers, printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Tribune War Track, Numbers 1," this statement of the committee is headed