CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,

Williamsport Turnpike, Md., July 15, 1863-3.15 a. m.

The cors will march in the following, viz: First Division leading, Second Division following, and Third Division bringing up the rear; the whole to move at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible; First Division moving off promptly.

By command of Major-General French:

O. H. HART,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[27.]

CIRCULAR.] HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

July 17, 1863.

The corps will move to-morrow a. m. the 18th instant, at 4 o'clock, cross the Potomac at Berlin, and passing to the left of Lovettsville will take the road to Waterford and bivouac in the vicinity of that town. The following order of march will be observed: First Division, General Cutler; Third Division, General Kenly; Artillery Brigade, Colonel Wainwright; Second Division, General Robinson; ambulance train; ammunition train; baggage train. Division commanders will detail an effective rear guard and under no circumstances permit any straggling. Division commanders will send a staff officer to these headquarters to-night to obtain the correcct time.

By command of Major General John Newton:

WM. RUSSELL, Jr.,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[27.]

ORDERS.] HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,

July 18, 1863.

The corps will move to-morrow a. m., the 19th instant, at 6 o'clock through Waterford to the vicinity of Hamilton, where it will bivouac for the night. The following order of march will be observed: Third Division, General Kenly; Second Division, General Robinson; Artillery Brigade, Colonel Wainwright; First Division, General Cutler; ambulance train; ammunition train; baggage train.

By command of Major General John Newton:

WM. RUSSELL, Jr.,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[27.]

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
Near Berlin, July 18, 1863.

A. LINCOLN,

President of the United States:

SIR: Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battle o Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The succeessful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operation of our present commanding general prior to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during this war been thrown in at just the right moment. In many cases when points were just being carried by the enemy a regiment or brigade appeared, to stop his progress and hurl him back. Moreover, I have never seen a more hearty co-operation on the part of general officers as