taken up the rails upon their roads for the purpose of preventing the passage of the troops to Washington; and further, that no possible means of transport could be had here. I immediately determined to seize upon the rolling-stock of the railroad and to march to Washington, repairing the track as we marched. I found in my regiment a number of persons competent as well to build a railroad as to run it, and with the engines and cars, means of subsistence could be brought along without any danger of fatiguing the men who were marching. I communicated this plan to Colonel Lefferts, of the Seventh Regiment (New York), and directed him to detail two companies to take and hold the depot and property in it, so that the engines might not be disabled, by detaching parts of them indispensable for use, during the night. I detailed a sufficient force of engine men to put the train in order to start at an early hour on Tuesday morning, believing the whole matter arranged, and left with a steam-tug to get off my troops in the middle of the night at high tide and bring them up to the wharf. This was successfully done, and on landing in the morning about 6 o'clock I found that my order to Colonel Lefferts had not been executed, and received from him a communication marked A, and forwarded herewith.*

Of the reasons for and propriety of this action on the part of the council of officers of the Seventh Regiment I have no opinions to express. The result of it was that we lost a day in opening communication with Washington. Upon landing I immediately detailed two companies of Eighth Massachusetts Regiment and took possession of the depot, giving a certified inventory of the property taken. These companies, assisted by the road-men that I had detailed, proceeded up the track and repaired [it] for about four miles, when they encamped for the night. In the morning, after a consultation, Colonel Lefferts marched with his regiment, together with the remainder of Colonel Munroe's regiment, along the railroad toward Washington, making the track as they went, and I have the honor to report that full communication is open between Annapolis and the Junction, and I believe through to Washington, but of that fact I hope to assure you before closing this report. I should have gone forward myself with this train to see it through, but the troops after [I] returned arrived, and it seemed more necessary that I should remain to move the troops forward, as I have done. Please find list of troops that have arrived and left Annapolis up to the present time. They are all unprovided with camp equipage and small stores, which will be necessary for their health. I was somewhat surprised to hear from Captain Stedman that you had appointed General Kline [Keim] to take my place here without any intimation to me of such appointment. It would be personally agreeable to me to be sent forward after I have so arranged the matters of detail that the post which Massachusetts men have won shall be retained. My attention was early called to the state of the defenses of this post, and I found them so defective against an interior enemy that a point which entirely commands Fort Madison and the town can be held upon the opposite side of the river; and indeed the mobs were actually to bring a battery there to annoy the Constitution on the day on which we took her out. Professor Lockwood has therefore made a survey of the place, and in accordance with his suggestions I have caused the hill to be occupied by 600 men from the Sixth New York Regiment, with two howitzers. I have also retained the battalion of rifles, Captain Devens, to aid in holding the Academy, all the young gentlemen being withdrawn from this place.

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*See p. 1272.

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