and Nashville Railroad have been required to render a report to these headquarters of their respective commands; but at they are now much scattered it will be some days before these reports can be collected for transmission. In the meantime, please accept the following in view of a more full report, which I can make on the receipt of those of my sub-ordinate commanders:

Morgan's force showed themselves in full strength at Cave City on the 24th of last month, and such were the accounts of his forces that I rapaired from my headquarters at Lebanon Junction to Munfordville to assure myself that the means provided for the defense of that position had been properly applied. On my arrival I found Colonel Hobson, commanding, fully prepared, his troops well posted, and the new set of earth-works on the north side of the ravine in good progress. I was much surprised to find those Parrott guns shipped for this post had not yet arrived. Leaving my assistant inspector-general, Captain Stacey, to proceed with the further inspection of the troops, I repaired to Louisville, and there found the missing, as well as the implements of the two 30-pounder Parrott guns, carried down to the train of that day and placed in position. Early in the morning of the 26th the above artillery and artillery stores were dispatched down the road, but it was too late. The train was turned back a short distance from Nolin, for the enemy had passed around Munfordville and was there cannonading the stockade at Bacon Creek. The three guns above named lay in the Nashville depot for three days waiting for transportatio. The stockade at Bacon Creek was reduced that day, and the enemy passed on, not attacking the Nolin stockade, for want of time, probably. On gaining Elizabethtown, Morgan found the Ninety-first Illinois in his way. I had been moved from the trestles in Muldraugh's Hill. The tree stockades at this place were not finished, and this regiment was obliged to betake itself to the houses of the place. The delay occasioned here was considerable. Had the stockades been completed it would have been greater. In dismissing a high officer for his neglect to push forward the work on the stockades, the Government vindicated the principles of discipline, but the act did not make cannonprof shelters for the Ninety-first Illinois to fight from, and that regiment was obliged to do its best from the houses of the place.

From Elizabethtown, Morgan passed over to destroy the trestles, about a mile apart. They had been prepared [with] earth-works with platforms for artillery. Suitable pieces, however, it proved impossible to obtain. There was partial shelter for the men, and I hoped that with their muskets they could make good their hold on the place for the day, sufficient to allow the pursuing force to overtake the rebels. Lieutenant-Colonel Matson joined the regiment during the night and took charge of the troops at both trestles, his lower one having been re-enforced by two companies of the Seventy-eight Illinois. Toward morning the enemy encompassed the position, and to meet the emergency Lieutenant-Colonel Matson called up to the Sulphur Fork trestle all of the troops. It was 3 p. m. before the artillery opened on our troops, and after somewhat more than an hour the surrender took place. It was while returning from carrying my orders to this post that Lieutenant John Speed, my aide-de-camp, was intercepted and captured. I had some hope of being able to re-enforce this position from Lebanon, but the demonstrations against the railroad leading to that point discouraget it. After the evelopment of the garrison at Sulphur Fork trestle, a company of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road toward the Rolling Fork stockade, burning Cave Run bridge.