regarded as the most difficult in the country, and because the then existing plan involved immediate active operations here. Grant was to send me troops enough to drive Longstreet out of the country. I was hurried here by urgent dispatches from Washington, because the Government was very apprehensive for the safety of our posiitonin East Tennessee. Our troops had been driven within the defenses of Knoxville, our animals starved to death, and the troops nearly so.

I had hardly become acquainted with the suitation when the whole aspect changed. The enemy, who was expectedto capture Knoxville and invade Kentucky, fell back after a little skirmishing, and retreated to Virginia. The whole programme was then changed. Instead of sending me the re-enforcements intended for me, more than half of the small force I then had was ordered to other departments./ Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days aog. They are fully acquainted with the condition of affairs. I have been acting all the time under their instructinos, and I believe with their entire approval. They are generally understood to be men whose opinion on military matters is entitled to respect. I cannot do more or better than to refer the Senate to them. On e thing is certain: I shall not be influenced one grain in the discharge of my duty by any question as to what action the Senate may take on my nomination. It is true I failed in getting the opporutnity I sought in coming here-to silence opposiiton by rendering valuable service in the most difficult commanding the country. The difficulties proved to beimagineary. The opportunity I sought did not exist in this command, and it would have been more than folly to have created one for personal ends. If I retain this command, opporutnities will not be wanting during the coming campaign. If the Senate is not satisfied as to my past serfvices, why not wait until they can know more? I am tired enough of this suspense, but still am perfectly willing to wait. In fact, I have become, in spite of myself, very indifferent on the subject. I am pretty thoroughly convinced that a major-general's commission is not worht half the trouble I and my friends have had about mine, and I feel very little inclination to trouble them, or even myself, any more about it. The Senate has its duty to perform in this matter, as well as myself and my superior officers. if Senators are not willing to act upon the concurrent testimony of all of my superior officers as to what service I have rendered, I shall not condescend to humbug them into the belief that I have done something which I really have not. You ask me what are the prospects of putting down the rebellion. I answer unhesitatingly that when the management of military matters is left to military men the rebellion will be put down very quickly and not before. I regard it as having been fully demonstrated that neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, nor the newspapers, nor the peopel of the United States, nor even all of them togetehr, can command an army. I rather think if you all let Grant alone and let himhave his own way he willend the war this year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he will or not. I find this letter is both too long and too ill'-natured. I feel too much as if I would like to "whip somebody anyhow," so I will stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon.

Yours, very truly,

J. M. SCHOFIELD.

[32.]