depots at Allatoona and Big Shanty were intended solely for the immediate use of the army. Forage, clothing, ordnance, hospital stores, and repairing material for the trains were accumulated at these points as they were needed. The depots of Nashville and Chattanooga had been expanded to meet any possible emergency, and buildings were erected at Johnsonville, the terminus of the Northwestern Railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. The buildings were necessary from the fact that the Tennessee River is the most reliable channel of communication at all seasons of the year to this portion of the Southwest. Suppliescan be safely transported to Johnsonville, and a comparatively small body of troops will suffice to protect the Northwestern Railroad thence to Nashville. At certain season of the year the water in the Cumberland is too low for navigation, and previous raids on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad made it expedient to establish a thirdline. This line was obtained by the construction of the Northwestern Railroad and the depot at Johnsonville.

On the 1st of July, 1864, General Sherman's army was in front of Kenesaw Mountain, 250 miles from Nashville. He had in round numbers 100,000 men and 80,000 animals; but notwithstanding this formidable force, and its great distance from its base by a signle line of rail running through mountain fastnesses, liable to be cut at any time, it never suffered for any essential supply. On the contrary it had abundance of everything neededfrom the moment it left Chattanooga to the fall of Atlanta. The quartermaster's departmetn has reason to congratulate itself in this result, for it was a grave question at the time whether it would be possible to accumulate sufficient supplies at Nashville and send them by a single line of rail to a huge army operating at such a distance from its base, so that it would not only be able to take Atlanta, the objective point of the campaign, defended asit was by apowerful army behind formidable earth-works, but be enabled to march thence to the sea. Soon after the occupation of Atlanta the rebel cavalry under Wheeler made a riad on the railroad in rearof the army and severed its communication between Atlanta and Chattanooga as also between Chattanooga and Nashville. On the 10th of September communications were restored and the utmost capacity of military railroads taxed to forward supplies. A fortnight brought news of plenty at all points.

The army was equipped in time for the brief campaign against Hood, early in Octobe, and the Twentieth Corps, hich held Atlanta, did not suffer for anything needed. The great damage sustainedby the railroad from Tunnel Hill to Marietta, Ga., by the movements of the enemy, crippled the department temporarily, but on the 1st of November everything went regularly forward, and the seaward-bound army was preparing for its march. All kinds of stores were in Atlanta at the proper time. The nature of the approaching campaign made it necessary to relieve the army of its surplus transportation and material. The officers of the quartermaster's department deserve great credit for the industry they displayed in collecting this property and shipping it to the rear. I have no knowledge that any large amount was lost, although independent commanders at isolated points in a few instances ordered the destruction of stores. In a range of country several hundred miles in extent, with troops using public property at innumerable points, it was difficult to withdraw them without incurring some loss.

Hood threatened Decatur in November and compelled their evacuation of its garrison. A considerable amountof public stores was sacrificed,