know have been made to this plan. First, that it would not do to withdraw troops from the defense of Richmond against attacks from other quarters, and second, that the roads and bridges along the south side of the Mattapony might not admit of the rapid marches and flank attack proposed by this plan. The first objection I have already answered in stating the facility and rapidity with these troops may be returned to Richmond, and may add that they would be a protection against any raid approaching the city from the west between the North Anna and James Rivers. As to the second objection, I have some personal knowledge of the country, having practiced law in those counties for several years, and my own belief of the practicability of the routes for such flaking movements on the enemy as I have sugested is confirmed by recent conversations with several intelligent and well-informed residents of those counties, who assure me that the roads and bridges (over small steams) on those routes along the southern side of the Mattapony are entirely practicable and favorable for such movements of artillery, as well as of cavalry infantry. I may add that no force pent up in the fork of the Pamunkey at Hanover Junction can prevent at attack in their rear by an enemy coming from the direction of either the White House and crossing the railroad about Chesterfield, as the last expedition proposed to do, or from Fredericksburg or down the Central Railroad from Louisa or Goochalnd; and the engineer officer who contructed the works recently erected to protect the bridges near Hanover Junction told me that they did not and could not protect these position against an attack from the west or rear, which could be protected only, and that impefectly, by a line of works extending some five miles between the North and South Anna Rivers. A reference to these views by yourself, the President, or General Lee to the large map of the State cannot, I think, fail to satisfy each of you of their correcness, as they have several prominent military men to whom they have been presented. A dangerous error exists as to the time needed to restore these bridges, &c., if destroyed. I assure you it would be impossible to do so in less that from sixty to ninety days.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

P. V. DANIEL, Jr.,

President, &c.

[27.]

General R. E. LEE,

Commanding Army of Northern Virginia:

GENERAL: In all the trials of your noble army my heart has been with you and my desire has been to be with and share your danger and hardships. I made repeated applications to be sent to you, but although promised that my brigade should be next sent, yet circumstances have prevented. I sincerely trust that it may be so arranged in the future that I may retake my place under you. My brigade is pronounced by all officers in unsurpassed condition, and I myself think I have never seen troops in such condent service. Can you not send some shattered brigade to rest and recruit and get the President to allow me to join you with my brigade? I am here temporarily to gurad against raiders, but do not think the place in danger.

I am, general, with sentiments of highest respect and esteem, your obedient servant.

M. JENKINS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.