the enemy a strategic point of operations the most important to him on the Gulf coast. It would give him a harbor for his fleet, a base of operations into the interior and upon New Orleans. It is of more value to him than Pensacola, because with the latter he could only reach Mobile by boats, which could not be commanded without command of Mobile Bay. With Mobile Bay, Pensacola would be assailable by land, and General Bragg would have two armies to fight, in his front and rear. Like ourselves, the people of New Orleans are exposed, and, like prudent and sensible people, they are busy with preparation to meet so probable an event as an attack. It will not do for us to defer action, because it is the duty of the Confederate or the State government to take measures for our safety. The first has its hands full in Virginia, Missouri, and the northern border. It is manfully straining every nerve in the grand struggle and is gloriously upholding the cause. Governor Moore has sent guns to the forts and ammunition to the city. His general-in-chief (Clemens) has been here by his orders to look after the city's safety. It is not yet safe. We have the best military authority for saying it can be made so, and, fortunately, with no very large expenditure of money. Until Forts Morgan and Gaines are secured against attack from a landing force, Mobile is in danger. Those forts rendered impregnable to assault or siege by land (we have no fears of the enemy's fleet), we have nothing left to apprehend but a land attack from the direction of Bayou la Batre, and when that comes we must go half way to meet it in the field. It would take a very little time to rally 20,000 Mississippians and Alabamians to our aid. But if the forts are carried, Mobile becomes untenable in its present condition. Our foe can lay out of danger, shell the people out of the city, and level its edifices to the ground. What we want, then, is guns, big guns, farreaching guns; first to fortify the land approaches to the two forts, and next, if they are carried, the approaches to the city. If we cannot get them from the Government at Richmond or Montgomery, we must make them ourselves. But to get them we must have money. We want, besides, a military head to our Mobile forces, engineer and artillery officers to determine the location and superintend the construction of batteries, and some armed steamers in the bay. The latter should lie constantly within reach of the two forts, so as to transport troops from one to the other in case of attack on either, and to hasten to the city for other troops. We repeat, we, the people of Mobile, are at war, and it is no longer safe to sleep upon the serious fact. We are authorized to say that the city authorities are alive to the danger that threatens, but are powerless to provide against it without the earnest and zealous assistance of the people. So far the two potent spells of climate - dread of yellow fever and Gulf storms - have protected us. In a few weeks those safeguards will be removed, and then we must rely upon big guns and men to fight them. Let the people think upon it.

[6.]

KNOXVILLE, September 4, 1861.

L. P. WALKER:

I will take possession of the road as soon as I can possible perfect an arrangement to run it. Mr. Langdon, agent of the quartermaster-general, and Major Wallace, president East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, are now aiding to perfect arrangements.*

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,

Brigadier-General.

[4.]

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* See Walker to Zollicoffer, September 4, VOL. IV, p. 401.

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