moving the Army of the Mississippi, 34,000 effectives, to East Tennessee to join with SMith's 20,000 and take the offensive. My reasons are: Smith is so weak as to give me great uneasiness for the safety of his line, to lose which would be a great disaster. They refuse to aid him from the east or south and put the whole responsibility on me. To aid him at all from here necessarily renders me too weak for the offensive against Halleck, with at least 60,000 strongly intrtenched in my front. With the country between us reduced almost to a desert by two armies and a drouth of two months, neither of us could will advance in the absence of rail transportation. It seemed to me then I was reduced to the defensive altogether or to the move I am making. By throwing may cavrly forward toward Grand Junction and Tuscumbia the impression is created that I am advancing on both places and they are drawing in to meet me. The Memphis and CHarleston road has been kept cut, so they jhave no use of it and have at length given it upl. Before they can know my movement I shall be in front of Buell at Chattanooga, and by cutting off his transportation may have him in a tight place. Van Dorn will be able to hold ihis own iwh about 20,000 on the Mississippi. Price stays here with 16,000. Thus you have my plan. I leave to- morrow for Mobile, thence to Chattanooga. Our cavalry is paving the way for me in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Crittenden is quite a prize, and the whole affair in proportion to numbers more brilliant than the grand battles where strategy seems to have been the staple oprduction on both sides; and if I am any judge the enemy beat us at it. We may congratulate ourselves that McClellan was satisfgied with changing his base, for it occurs to my obtuse mind that a bold stroke at Richmond, while we were hunting for him, would have ruined us. The papers seem to be groping in the dark as to the reasons which influenced the cahge here, and attributing motives to each of us never entertained by either. Fortunatley we know each other too well and have this cause too much at heart to be influenced by these things.*

Hoping for your restoration and return, truly yours,

BRAXTON BRAGG.

[16.]

VICKSBURG, July 22, 1862.

The PRESIDENT:

An atmpt made this morning by two iron- clad rams to sink the Arkansas. The failure so complete that it was alm ost ridiculous. Several men were, however, killed by a shot entering one of her ports. Canal will be a failure. Nothing can be accomplished by the enemy unless they bring overwhelming numbers of troops. This must be anticipated.

EARL VAN DORN,

Major- General.

[15.]

TUPELO, MISS., July 24, 1862.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:

Start for Chattanooga; one day in Mobile; 5,000 troops a day. Trains move across country. Leave General Pri e in command here.

For reply, see VOL. XVI, Part I, p. 711.