tion to the defense of the Mississippi River and to ack your consideration of their contents. It seems to me now clearly developed that the enemy has two principal objects in view, one to get possession of the Mississippi River and the other to the capital of the Confederate States. As to the last, our recent success at Fredericksburg gives assurance that a least during the present winter Richmond may be successfully defended, and at best its capture can only valuable by the effect which it would produce upon the public opinion abroad and by the destruction of manifactories and other resources very essential to our future efforts. But the control of the Mississippi River will be not only indirectly valuable to the enemy, by the injury which its loss would iflict upon the Confederate States, bu directly by furnishing the best possible base for operations in the Valley both the east and west side of the river, by answering the exignet demant of the Northwestern States for the restoration to them of the unrestricted use of that river and by utilizing the heretofore fruitless possission of New Orleans. In my former communications to you I prossed the necessity for co-operation and co-intelligence of our armies on the opposite side of the river. I had hoped that it might have been possible while the river was low to capture Helena, and thus give the best security against invasion by water of the territory of Arkansas, but this has not been effected I cannot doubt that it has heretofore been impracticable, and the present rise in the river does not permit us to hope that if now taken we should be able to so fortify and arm the place as to make it subserve the purposes indicated. Therefore, to prevent the enemy getting control of the Mississippi and dismembering the Confederacy, we must mainly rely upon maintaining the points already occupied by defensive works, to wit, Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

From the best information at command, a large force is now ready to descend the Mississippi and co-operate with the army advancing from Memphis to make an attack upon Vicksburg. Large forces are also reported to have been sent to the Lower Mississippi for the purpose of ascending the river to attempt the reduction of Port Hudson by an attack on both the land and water sides. The letters inclosed will show you are the inadequacy of the forces here to meet the trial to which it will be exposed. If the enemy should succeed in their attempts he will be then left free to concentrate his forces against your department, and though your valor may be relied upon to all that human power can effect it is not to be expected that you could make either long or successful resistance. It seems to be, then, ungestinably best that you should re-enforce General Johnston, so as to enable you successfully to meet the enemy, and by his defeat to destroy his power for such future operations against you as would be irresistible by your isolated force, and by the same means to place the army here in such condition as would enable it in turn to re-enforce you when the season will make it practicable for you by active to expel the enemy from Arkansas, and having secured you rear, to advance to the deliverance of Missouri. I have never been unmindful of the facility with which the enemy could invade Arkansas by means of the White and Arkansas Rivers, nor underrated the importance of your having the proper works and sufficient garrisons to prevent that movement; but at this season and in the devastated condition of the country it seems to me impossible that any large force can invade through the northwestern part of Arkasans, and from the forces in that region I hope you will be able to detach the required number of men to re-enforce General Johnston to the extent set forth in the accompanying letters. We cannot hope at