with the Texans the death of their brave and accomplished leader, Major R. M. White. Lieutenant H. S. Johnston, of King's battery, for extraordinarys kill and daring, merits the highest praise, which is alike due to all the officers and soldiers who composed Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward's command.

By command of Brigadier General W. H. Jackson:

GEO. MOORMAN,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[23.]

COMMITTEE OF SAFETY,

Mobile, May 12, 1863.

His Excellency JOHN GILL SHORTER:

Yesterday I addressed you in behalf of committee in relation to the appointment of General Mackall in place of General Buckner, who, we understand, has been relieved. I alluded also to the condition of the city, as to troops for its defense, as a matter worthy of your attention. I did not speak particuarly, for it occurred to me that you knew our condition. On second thought, it occursa to me better to speak more distinctly. We are nearlys tripped of soldiers, and it ought not to be so. The enemy has large forces in Louisiana and has command of the sea. It is in their power to land a sufficiently large number of men on the Mississippi coast and by a rapid march threaten us in the rear. Why should Mobile be so left? It has certainly done its share in this war, it is of great consequence to the State, and is probably the largest city in the Confederacy. The loss of New Orleans has delayed our recognition; now if Mobile were to fall into the enemy's hands further indefinite delay would occur and it would be a matter of grat difficulty to retake it. I know that all points cannot be guarded to an aboslute certainty, b ut the prominent points may and ought to be. We have, as you know, extensive works here. By water we are probably safe, but our land works ought to be guraded. The late raid into Mississippi has shown the enemy some of our weakness. Who knows what course he may take next? The destruction of a few bridges and a small portion of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad would deprive us of aid from the ARmy of the Mississippi, and the city might fall and with it the river left open to the ravages of the neemy. No one can doubt that troops enough should awlays be here to repel any sudden incursion and delay the advance of an enemy, to gain time for re-enforcements to arrive. There should be neough here to lend aid to any point on the railroad above us that may be threatened. Why is this department left a mre dependency upon an officer 500 miles away? If he needs a few troops, he calls all away from here; and that done by a man who can have but little knowledge of our condition, and of course can't feel the interest he would if on the spot. We hope this thing may be attended to or evil may come of it, and we beg earnestly your remonstrances at Richmond. Charleston and Savannah have everything they call for; Mobile gets but little. They are made an independent command and are not weakened by calls from abroad from a man at a distance, while Moible is a mere dependency of the Army of Tennessee and liable to be abandoned at any moment.

Very respectfully,

P. HAMILTON,

Chairman, &c.

[15.]