administration has been confessedly judicious and conservative, and has avoided offense to the loyal while conciliating the few disaffected in his department. He has been successful in drawing from within the enemy's lines, to a gratifying extent, both men and provisions. He has not been able to strike very decisive blows, not from want of will or enterprise, but because when, with his limited forces, on several occasions plans of action had been formed by him, events occurring elsewhere have compelled the Department to withdraw a portion, or, from prudential considerations for other contemplated movements, to withhold him from their execution. Nor can the Department agree in considering the raids which have occurred in his department, and which constitute the most specific grounds of complaint in your letter, as not having been fully met and repelled. It is, of course, in so extensive a department, accessible through so many avenues and mountain passes, impossible, with the limited forces at command in it, to prevent the occurrence of such rapid incursions; but in no other department have they been more successfully encountered and punished.

Three prominent raids only are now recalled. The one to Lewisburg, which was repelled with brilliant success by Major Edgar and his few brave companions; the one to Wytheville, where the enemy were signally punished and compelled to beat a hurried retreat, adn the late more formidable incursion of General Averell, which gave opprotunity for the decided victory at the White Sulphur. That the assailing forces in the two latter cases were not intercepted adn captured in their retreat may justly be regretted, but can hardly be a matter of surprise when it is recollected how rapid was the retreat of the discomfited foe, and how difficult it is beforehand to arrange the combinations and movements necessary to stop fleeing cavlary, having divers routes of retreat open to them, and naturally seeking those least guarded.

On the whole, the result of these ineffectua the Department to afford, rather, grounds of increased confidence than of reproach toward the commanding general. It should be recollected, to, that the main objects to be specially guarded by General Jones in his department, viz, the railroad connections and the salt-works, have been defended and preserved intact, but that, in order to attain these ends, a considerable portion of his limited force has been necessarily kept inactive on defensive watch at strategic points.

In the late operations of General Jones in East Tennessee the Department likewise sees additional cause for confidence in his valor and judgment. He has penetrated far into a country occupied by much more numerous forces; has covered an impotant district, which othrewise must have been overrun and ravaged, and though naturally unable to prevent, with all the passes of the mountains laid open by the disastrous surrender of Cumberland Gap, the raids of small parties of the enemy's cavalry in his rear, had encountered and defeated with loss the embodied force that sought to inclose and crush him. His operations, too, have given effectual security to the salt-works and the railroad communication within his department proper.

This detailed review has been made at greater length than I had contemplated, from a just regard to the opinions of such intelligent representatives of the people of General Jones' department as yourselves, and from solicitude to remove what seems to me erroneous impressions, doing injustice to his conduct and merits. Hope is entertained that further consideration and fuller information will end in satisfaction and confidence in General Jones' qualifications on the part of yourselves and your constituents, and I shall be happy if by this