bad and I find myself so much occupied that I shall not be able to see you to say good-bye. When I heard the report around camp that I was to go into East Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means of making the move with security and the hope of great results. As every others move had been proposed to the general and rejected or put off till time made them more inconvenient, I came to the conclusion as soon as the report reached me that this was to be that fate of our army-to wait till all good opportunities had passed, and then, in desperation, to seize upon the least favorable one. As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the general, I thought it possible that we might accomplish something by encouraging his own move, and proposed the following plan, viz, to withdraw from our present lines, and the forces now in East Tennessee (the latter to be done in order to give the impression to theenemy that we were retiring from East Tennessee and concetrating near here for battle or for some other movement), and place our army in a strong (concentrated) position. The movement the army was together make a detachment of 20,000 to move rapidly against Burnside and destroy him, and by continued rapid movements to threaten the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent that might be necessary to draw him out from his present position. This at best is a tedious process, but I thought it gave promise of some result, and was therefore better than lying here destroying ourselves. The move, as I proposed it, would have left this army in a strong position and safe, and would hae made sure the capture of Burnside; that is, the army here could spare 20,000 if it were in the position that I proposed better than it can spare 12,000 occupying the lines that it now does. Twenty thousand men well handled could surely have captured Burnside and forces. Under present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as they now are, and the detachment is to be, say, 12,000. We thus expose both to failure and really take no chance to ourselves of great results. The only notice my plan received was aremakr that General Hardee was pleased to make: "I don't think that that is a bad idea of Longstreet's." I understood to explain the danger of having such a long line under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst, and within twelve minutes' march of any portion of our line; but I was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my did not even receive notice. It was not till I had repeated, however, that General Hardee even noticed me. Have you any maps that you can give or lend me? I shall need everything of the kind. Do you know any reliable people living near and east of Knoxville whom I might get information of the condition, strength, &c., of the enemy? I have wirtten in such hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp, &c., that I doubt if I have made myself understood.

I remain, very sincerely, your friend,

J. LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General.

[Indorsement.]

MORRISTOWN, EAST TENN., February 1, 1864.

Lieutenant General J. LONGSTREET:

GENERAL: It seems to me, after reading this letter again, that its predictions are so full a vindication of your judgment of the movements then ordered that it should remain in your possession, with a