principles. It is a question, however, whether this is the point at which our forces should be concentrated, not on account of difficulties suggested by a map, but mainly those made by the dependence of the army ou would form upon the railroad between this point and Atlanta for the accumulation of the supplies necessary for any offensive movement. How far that road may be dependend on you may judge from the fact that it is so little supplying this comparatively small force that I am now preparing to send artillery and wagon trains to the rear, because we are unable to procure forage for the army here. In the last three days we have received but a half ration of corn for our stock, although with even decent management of the road we could accumulate rapidly. To advance from this point we must be prepared for a march of 130 miles through a rugged desert if we take the direction of Nashville, the passage of the Tennessee inclusive. The equipage of a single bridge would require 150 wagons. It would be necessary to haul all forage, after accumulating it by railroad-inclusive, of course, that for the large train of the commissary department. The supplies of food for man and beast would be somewhat less, and the march less difficult, if the direction of Huntsville should be taken. The distance to Nashville would be increased. A movement into East Tennessee could not be made unless the country is capable of sustaining the army, which thence might move into Kentucky or march into the northern part of Middle Tennessee.

It is very unlikely, however, that East Tennessee could furnish the necessary supplies. Either this or the march toward Huntsville would give up to the enemy this route to Atlanta. But can the intermediate route, the direct one to Nashville, be taken without the siege of chattanooga-now a fortress; and can we make a siege? I think not, especially one for which supplies must be brought over this Georgia railroad. You contemplate the concentration of our forces here and rapid march upon the enemy before he can concentrated. It is to be considered that our troops to be concentrated are now spread over the whole Confederacy, while his could be united in two or three days and that after our army is formed it must march with great trains through a barren and mountainous country inhabited by people many of whom are disloyal, so that no movement could be concealed. It seems to me, therefore, that our chance to advance directly from this point depends on the enemy's first making the attempt upon us. In that event we should be ready, if we defeat them, to press on through Tennessee. It would be easier to penetrate into Middle Tennessee from Northern Mississippi than from Georgia. We should have no mountains to cross nor barren country to pass through, and an abundant country the march. The passage of the river wold be less difficult, too. But that enterprise would involve the abandonment of this route into the interior of Georgia. I believe, however, that a good body of cavalry could prevent an army (hostile) from reaching Atlanta in a month, and in that time the progress made from Mississippi would compel its return. This is my present idea. Do not, therefore, let it get out, but consider it. it is as interesting to me now to receive your military opinions asit was when we were side by side in Virginia.

Yours, truly,

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Your estimate of the strength of this army is too great by 10,000, and longstreet, besides, has a separate command.

J. E. J.

[32.]